Five Things You Should Know About Christoper Dorner: Myth Busted

Folks, on Twitter, I have made no qualms about my feelings about Christopher Dorner. He is a murderer plain and simple. I won't be using this as a post to defend him or his actions. This post is mostly to talk about his mortality and the myths that surround him.

1. Dorner was not an operator.  First, let's define "operator". An operator is anyone who is engaged in direct action covert operations. They come from the special operations and intelligence community.  They receive extensive training in things ranging from combat SCUBA to defensive driving, ordnance, small infantry tactics, covert infiltration, and high-altitude low opening (HALO). This training takes YEARS. And it takes even longer before some are considered operational. Many don't even get to go to schools right away before they go operational. Here's what we know about Dorner. He was an aviation school washout. What does that mean? The Navy tried for two years to make Dorner a pilot but couldn't for undisclosed reasons. These reasons could have been weight (he gained weight dramatically over the years), physical disability, ineptitude, or variety of dis-qualifiers  This compounds the myth further because the Navy spent a lot of money trying to train Dorner to be a pilot. So what happened next? They sent him to be a part of a riverine unit. This sounds pretty cool. Here's the problem. Dorner only stayed with that unit for 2 years before he was forced to move on. You will notice a pattern when examining his record. He has a history of bouncing from military unit to military unit.  Most likely, when you see such movements and not rapid promotions or earned recognition, it is indicative of someone who couldn't quite fit in. By the time he finished his deployment in Bahrain where he guarded an oil platform (a job Army cooks were doing for a while), his career in the Navy was nearing its end.  Dorner lacked any of the operational or training requirements to meet any criteria associated with being an operator.
2. Dorner was a narcisssist. He used scary terms like "asymmetrical warfare" to bolster who he wanted people to think he was. In his manifesto, he was no longer Christopher Dorner, Navy and LAPD washout. No. He became a mythical persona. He was someone out of a Hollywood revenge movie. He became something he couldn't be in real life - special and unique. He believed LAPD had robbed him of that. Count how many times Dorner used the pronoun "I". It's quite extensive. Also notice how he never went to DoJ or any other entity. The slight wasn't against his victims. LAPD had done something far worse. They picked on Christopher Dorner.
3. He was mortal. There are several signs we have of Dorner's mortality. Let's look at his failed escape attempts. An experienced operator plans his missions with meticulous detail. They don't miss anything. The one thing they never mess up is their extraction. Dorner messed up all of his extraction plans. After he robbed the old man at the marina of his boat, he forgets to secure the tow line. It, as we know, got caught in the propeller and the boat never left its dock. This is seamanship 101. How does a harbor cop like Dorner miss this? Because he's not a pro. He hadn't planned on everything to include his adrenaline overcoming his thinking. It happens to a lot of people in combat. This is why operators are heavily screened to judge how they operate under stressful conditions. Dorner's extraction from Big Bear failed as well. I'm not talking about the fire. I'm speaking of before that. Let's look at what went wrong there. He believes he can drive off-road skillfully which is evidenced in his manifesto. Again, he did not forecast poor weather conditions nor the amount of stress he would be under. So what does he do? He wrecks his transportation, breaks the axle, and is forced to set the truck on fire.
   
   He also didn't realize the Marshals were on to this extraction. They had marshals and Recon Marines conducting surveillance on his hideaway spot when they saw the fire. Sensing the impending arrival of law enforcement agencies and knowing the roads would soon be blocked, he tried to hold a couple hostage. This planned failed because they got away and told police who made contact and engaged Dorner. He was killed not by police but by the realization that for all his talk, he was just a washout.
4. Dorner may have had access to information he shouldn't have had but that doesn't mean he had any of the tools or knowledge he claimed. I won't get into how or why or even if Dorner had access to undercover vehicle plates. Here's what I will tell you. Having those plates and recognizing them under stress in real time are totally different. Remember Dorner would have to be trained and skilled in vehicle counter-surveillance. This takes months of training to perfect. This training we know Dorner did not get in the Navy or with LAPD. His Navy time was spent with aviation training units and doing coastal security. I have experience in military law enforcement and security more extensive than Dorner while active duty and I was also in charge of requisitioning training for assets in my unit. No such training exists for anyone in any of Dorner's previous billets. Also, Dorner wouldn't have time to run down every suspicious vehicle following him.
   
   He also used terminology very familiar to military and law enforcement personnel and most people who have read a Vince Flynn novel. He claimed he had HUMINT (human intelligence or spies) when in fact, he was alluding to social engineering (calling schools and hospitals to obtain information he needed). He claimed he had IMINT (imagery intelligence). There is no way he had access to any discernible IMINT technologies. These require a very involved intelligence tasking and have considerable oversight. Additionally, satellites cost money. What he had was Google Earth and possibly some aerial photos that would be very dated. Having this information and using it are also completely different. He could plan escape routes but no way he could plan target mitigation with dated or unreliable data flawlessly. His signals intelligence came from scanners.
   
   He also had knowledge someone would expect of an LAPD officer so he knew basic tactics and procedures. What he could not have known  is that people he was matching wits with (those analysts he called out) are all experienced intelligence analysts and officers from various operational theaters. Studying threats is what they do for a living. When you get a second, look into where the people who work at fusion centers, JTTF, and VICAP come from. Talking and planning for them is kind of easy. Where it gets tough is whether your plan is superior to anything they've encountered previously. 
5. Dorner also gave away a lot of information about himself in that manifesto. When you talk to the cops, you always give them more information than you should. Dorner gave them insight into his personality, his intellect, his methodologies, and what tools he could have. I've already talked about his personality and that his intellect was somewhat congruent with someone who is a college graduate. His methodologies and tools were expected. We knew he'd shoot it out with the cops because he said so and did it. His tools were also greatly exaggerated. There is no way he had access to MANPADS. He doesn't have the income or the resources needed to get something al Qaeda couldn't get into the US. Dorner gave an 11-page blueprint that spelled out his demise.

Whatever you think of Dorner, know this - he was very mortal. He made mistakes that no experienced person would have made. He lacked the background and tools to pull off what he claimed he could. Dorner was military-trained but flunked out of every single advanced training he was given. We panicked that he would find a plane but records indicated he had no pilot's license. He couldn't even get a boat out of port. He wrecked a truck and broke its axle because he didn't check the weather for ice and snow. He burned all of his weapons and camping gear which he would need to survive the massive manhunt on Big Bear. Allowing his hostages to escape caused the local cops to be on his trail and corner him in a cabin where he would burned before presumably shooting himself. I say all of this to debunk the myth surrounding this murderer and bring some illumination on the nature of the killer of four people.

The Top 7 Questions You Should Be Considering When Improving Home Security

The show above is a clear demonstration as to how security professionals should approach home security planning and risk analysis.

Many times I'm asked by various people how to properly secure their home. Initially, it can be very difficult sometimes to give advice as to how to provide adequate security for your residence. I feel in order for your home to be secure you must first realistically assess your risk tolerance, the nature of the threat and your vulnerabilities, and what you're willing to do to mitigate the threat. I do this by asking several questions:

1. What's security mean to you? Most people look bedazzled when I ask this. I firmly believe security is a mindset and not a result. If you live in a really nice neighborhood with no crime, you might feel secure with your door unlocked. However, in a bad neighborhood, that may not be ideal. So what makes you secure?
2. What can't you lose? Some people naturally reply "nothing". I have had some be very specific. This is an important question to ask because most people may not need to spend hundreds of dollars on elaborate security if the only thing they're afraid of losing is fairly replaceable if lost. That also depends on personal perspective. Losing my father's watch would be a terrible loss for me but not someone else. In sales, they call these first two questions "What's your pain?"
3. What's your terrain like? In other words, what's the nature of the environment you're securing? Is this a high crime area? Do people routinely talk to their neighbors? Are you visible during the day? Is your neighborhood well-patrolled by police? If not, why? Most people don't have a good answer for this last question, though, it may be the most important one. Does your property allow visitors inside without credentialing them? This question is especially important for those who live in housing developments with rental units. Are there ways your neighbors and others can naturally see your home unobstructed? You should see some recurring themes from previous articles.
4. What's the threat? In other words, who wants your stuff? How do they know your stuff or could know it? The threat identity question is the most important question you can ask yourself and anyone who asks for your advice. Figure out who is likely to attack the home and for what reasons (home invasions, stalker, burglars, etc.). You may have to get an accounting of the client or yourself (if it's your home). That means asking about prior domestic violence, violent crime in the area or the home, any overt threats made, attacks on homes nearby, shady people seen in the neighborhood. From there, use the third question about terrain to determine likelihood of an attack.
5. Just how vulnerable are you? Many people have two ways of assessing vulnerabilities and neither of them work - being overly optimistic or overly pessimistic. Homeowners think the way normal, law-abiding citizens do when they think of burglars. They assume burglars look for the same things they do. Often, they get these faulty ideas from television or vivid imaginations. Just because you might be able to climb a ledge and walk to your window two stories up with perfect agility doesn't mean a drug-addicted burglar will even care. So how does someone think like a criminal and find vulnerabilities? First, be realistic. Next, check for yourself. Crooks have experience so they already know what does and does not work. I'm not telling you to break a window but there's no harm trying to drive a wedge in a door or walking on the other side of your fence to see what a burglar would see. Walk around your neighborhood and ask yourself what house looks the easiest to hit. Then ask yourself why. Ask yourself what would the burglar do with your stuff. Will he pawn it? If so, then an inventory of all of your high risk items is necessary with serial numbers.
6. Next, what can you do to protect yourself? Most people's natural security reflex is to buy a safe and then an alarm. Good? Nope. Actually both are terrible in some cases though not all. I like safes and alarms. However, what good are both if you don't understand why they were made? An alarm cannot stop all burglars. Many bad guys will already plan for this and hit your house any way. Alarms are great for getting the cops there as soon as possible. Picking a reputable company to install and monitor it is absolutely key. Safes are designed to slow thieves down. No safe is impenetrable. Every safe has a weakness. Most consumer safes have the same vulnerability - you can transport them. You can pick them up and take them somewhere to be cracked later. So what should a homeowner with one do? Bolt it to the floor and buy a safe that doesn't have electrical locks. Trust me. Don't buy a big threatening dog either. Some dogs work but some don't. Don't gamble your property or your life hoping a canine will stop an attack. Guns are great against home invasions and other intruders. However, don't advertise them. Remember what I said about gun buy-back programs.
7. Finally, what are you willing to sacrifice to feel secure? The number one complaint about security always revolves around convenience. I don't care what you're protecting. Someone will complain about the inconvenience on their time, energy and money to have it. The toughest part of consulting anyone on home and personal protection is this part. People can't wrap their heads around giving up something to protect against a threat they may never see. Remind them (and yourself) threats don't engage us on our calendars. They may not come now or anytime soon. However, it is better to be prepared and be able to live your life securely and worry-free than to not prepare and lose things you hold most dear.

These questions are tough but necessary before you can advise anyone on how to properly secure their homes. I recommend giving them (and yourself) a few days to think about the first two questions as these will surely be the hardest. As you're asking these questions, don't be afraid to ask if you missed something. Finally and most importantly, give the client a chance to contribute - it's their security after all. If it's your house, get your entire household involved. The more stake everyone has in this process the easier it is to have a comprehensive security plan.

Do you have any suggestions on what other questions homeowners should be asking? Feel free to leave a comment or a question below.

Visualizing Mass Shootings in America (1982 - 2012)

Click on the map to enlarge

Here's what I like about this infographic. It not only let's you see data by location but also by mental illness, weapons legally acquired, venue, weapon type, race, gender, and year. Be sure to click on the map to enlarge it so you can see the graph.

Take a look at the actual data:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/pub?key=0AtIWtgxch7DtdERIVnowSkx4NGRjN3E4UjdWMHNRY3c&output=html