OPINION: Why Does It Suck To Think Like A Good Guy In Security

Day after day, on social media and elsewhere on the Internet, there are lots of folks who are seemingly shocked every time a bad guy shows up and acts like a bad guy. Seriously, how many times have you read or seen "I can't believe Suspect A was able to murder all of those people" or "If only they (security) did XYZ like I thought of during a conversation with my veterinarian who may have been in the military, that bad thing wouldn't have happened"? I see it quite a bit and frankly, I've decided it may be time to finally add my .02 about it.

Those of us in security who have spent some time studying "the threat" (insert whatever scary bad guy you're dealing with) understand what few who haven't studied it don't. No matter how awesome your protective measures are, they do little to mitigate (and certainly not "prevent") the attacker unless you start thinking a bit like they do. Herein lies the fatal flaw of most "white hats" and even some "grey hats".

1. You think of attacks in ways that you would conduct them. No offense but if you're protecting yourself against robbers but know relatively little of them, you may be looking to deploy solutions which don't work against that threat. One of the most painful things any security professional can hear when doing a site survey with a client from the client is "If I were the bad guy, this is how I would do it." More often than not, it is not how the bad guys would attack. Think security cameras in homes. Most people will deploy a camera at home with the thought the camera provides an extra layer of protection when in fact it doesn't. I have known several victims of home invasions who either had cameras installed or had an alarm sign out front. These are two commonly deployed deterrence tools that we know don't work. Instead, focus on the problem as if the bad guy would ignore the deterrence measures (because he will because we have little proof he won't) and proceed with the attack and use things like cameras as after-incident mitigation tools to catch the perpetrator later.
2. You think of your threat as one-dimensional. Most good guys see their threat based on commonly accepted precepts of what the threat is and how he has attacked in the past. Just because the bad guy only hit you or the other guy using one vector doesn't mean he won't try something different later. A great example of this is 9/11. Prior to the second World Trade Center attack, there were common beliefs that terrorists were only capable of performing certain kinds of attacks. What no factored in was changing realistic threat capabilities. In other words, we assumed the threat wasn't evolutionary in his tactics. Seriously, who could've imagine having to protect a building against two near-simultaneous aircraft crashes? Perhaps we could have had we accepted the idea that as we change so does the threat.
3. You think the threat is omnipotent and omnipresent. It's easy to get caught up in the hype of a threat. I do it sometimes. This is a natural defense mechanism after an attack has occurred. Why? No one likes to have their vulnerabilities exposed. After every mass shooting or act of violence that makes the news, we assume every venue that is like the one that was attacked is also vulnerable and being selected as the "next" target for another perpetrator.
   
   I remember fondly working on 9/11 on a small Air Force base on a perimeter patrol. What I recall the most are the initial attitudes people had of al Qaeda. We believed this one attack displayed a level of sophistication unseen by them before on US soil could be replicated on a massive scale. Every Muslim, ignorantly, was assumed to be a sleeper agent waiting for cues from "Muslim HQ" to attack us wherever and however they chose. The months and years ahead showed how far from the truth that was. Imagine how many countless resources were expended before we realized the fallacy behind this assumption.
4. You think your attacker "chose" you for a variety of reasons he didn't. People almost always assume an attacker chose to attack them or others for reasons they didn't. Rape is commonly thought to be a crime of lust because good people believe sex is the only reason you rape because it's the end-result. However, most criminologists and psychologists would agree rape is a crime of power. I would argue the majority of crime takes place for this very reason. Terrorism occurs because of this as does murder (what's more powerful than ridding yourself of someone permanently), drug dealing, fraud, and a host of other crimes. You're either fighting to obtain it (i.e. steal it from someone else) or committing crime to become more powerful. This confusion could possibly explain why most crime "prevention" measures based on policy fail at alarming rates - we're clueless on what truly motivates people to attack us.
5. You assume because you haven't seen the threat, he must not exist. Whether we see the threat or not, we should never assume he does not exist. While the threat can't be everywhere every time, the threat can still be very much. Never assume the absence of threat means he or she isn't going to show. You still need to adequately protect your assets as if today is the day you're going to be attacked. Remember, the attacker chooses the time of attack. You choose how well-prepared you'll be when it happens.

I'm not proposing anyone go out and hire a red team. I firmly believe one of the reasons we, often, fail so miserably at security sometimes is due to our natural inclination to think the bad guy thinks like we do when they don't. So how can we fix this?

1. Study your adversary. Seriously, pour over any open source intelligence you can on your threat. Read the paper and look for crime stories. Pick up a police report or two on similar venues like yours. I'll leave how you conduct your research to you. Just do it. Stop assuming blindly how the attack will go down or even who your adversary is.
2. Consider hiring folks who can think like attackers. I'm not saying you hire criminals but red teams hire specialists who can mimic attackers. Choose folks from a variety of backgrounds to round out your security team. By the way, by "background", I'm not talking education. I mean pick a team with a variety of specialists.
3. Test your systems with exercises. The only way you're going to learn is by testing how well your security program holds up against an actual attack. Consider doing this with little to no notice and have an after-action or "hot-wash" debriefing with your red team and affected staff right away. Finally, fix the vulnerabilities as soon as possible.
4. Reward outside the box thinking. When I was a young boy, I recall my fondest memories were playing games like "hide-and-go-seek" with my friends. The guys who were the most creative were the best at this game. Why? Because they were unpredictable. I'll leave how you choose to reward these folks on your own. Just do it.

PHOTO: Fake Cameras Provide Fake Protection

I can't even begin to tell you how many times I run into stores that have decoy cameras in lieu of real cameras. I also can't tell you how many countless times these same stores get robbed. Buying a decoy camera, in my opinion, are invitations for criminals. This is not to say most criminals can't tell the difference between fake and real. This is to say that many of these businesses and homes that utilize decoy cameras don't quite get what kind of mitigators they need to adequately protect themselves and their assets.

The added statistic at the bottom of this photograph is especially troubling because it dupes customers into believing they have added another layer of "security". This is correct in some respects. Remember what I said about "security" being a goal and less of an action? The problem lies in exactly the same place issues of semantics in security are - it relies on data that is either incomplete and more than likely, irrelevant to their protection needs.

We all know cameras serve a variety of purposes other than video surveillance. We also understand some vendors and property owners either have poor tools or are so under-trained they may as well not have a camera. However, when an incident happens, the last thing property owners want to tell the police and insurance companies (worse yet, a jury in a civil liability trial) is they thought a decoy or non-operative camera offered better protection.

If you're a property owner and considering one of these decoys, turn around and invest in a camera system you will monitor and maintain. If you're a pro, call these out and the dangers behind using them.

The Semantics of Security - The Great Enabler of Security Ignorance

One of the toughest and most insightful lessons I learned came during a conversation with a good military buddy about why English is such a difficult language to learn. "You never mean the things you say. You say you "love" your car in Spanish, it means you love it like family. It's as if you use the words so much they lose their actual meaning." I was a bit taken aback by this. No one had ever explained the issue of semantics so eloquently before to me.

This same thing happens in security and explains what makes it so difficult for so many professionals and lay-people to be able to comprehend it. The following are great examples:

1. Prevention versus mitigation. Prevention is defined by Websters as "the action of stopping something from happening or arising." Mitigation is defined by Websters as "the action of reducing the severity, seriousness, or painfulness of something." The words mean something completely different from the other, yet are used interchangeably. In security, getting these two words wrong can mean the difference between a loss of life (yours or an innocent) and victory over an attacker. Having lofty goals of prevention through methods and measures seldom tested with actual bad actors, often leads to failure when they do show up. However, having sound mitigators in place should they attack, could save both life and property and result in the consequential capture of your bad actor. The decision to stop his or her actions is totally dependent upon his or her decisions and plans before and during the attack. Your measures could help persuade them not to attack but I would hardly call this prevention without more quantifiable evidence.
2. Vulnerability assessment versus reconnaissance. A vulnerability assessment is a process which entails analyzing a client's assets to determine likely avenues of approach for attackers. It could involve talking to stakeholders, physical walkthroughs of the assets, imagery analysis, and red-team exercises. Reconnaissance is a process which entails some covert surveillance resulting in a report to the target's adversary to support a plan of attack on the target. These terms are often confused because people assume one means the other. Typically, bad actors do recon and friendly agents do vulnerability assessments. The latter could use the former as part of a red-team exercise or even as part of a walkthrough. However, the methods by which either is done are very different. Keeping this in mind prevents amateurs from thinking by doing reconnaissance, they are in some way doing a complete vulnerability assessment.
3. Security versus protection. It grates my nerves to hear people say they are "doing security". I find most people have no true understanding of what the term means and are therefore, ill-suited for and failing miserable at the task they think they are doing. As I've discussed before, security is a mental construct wherein our protective measures are adequate enough in our minds to mitigate bad actors and their attacks to make us feel secure. It's a subjective term but more of a goal and less of an action than anything else. Protection is what we do to make the environment secure enough to assuage our fears of a possible attack.
4. Arrested versus detained. It took me a while to get used to this. They both sound like they should mean the same thing but they do not. Ask anyone who has ever been arrested. Being arrested has an element of detention but it isn't the totality of the action. You can be detained without being arrested. While this may sound like an issue of semantics, ask your legal counsel to explain what happens in security when you confuse your ability to detain versus your arrest powers.
5. OPSEC. OPSEC is one of the latest buzzwords to come into the modern security lexicon. Everyone believes they do it but few actually do to include me at times. Seriously, everyone on social media who is in our industry seems to have a burner cell phone number, 10 fake IDs, wall safes for their wall safes for the wall safes with their encrypted USB, uses TOR to hide from the NSA (as if), etc. The first rule of being good at operations security is to shut up about OPSEC. What's the first thing people do when they think they've done something awesome with respect to OPSEC? They tweet about it on a source they don't own with people they don't know or could vet with any realistic degree of certainty, using communication they know very little about on the Internet which was created by some of their adversaries who have actively engaged in intelligence operations here since its inception. So if so few get it, why do they think they've adequately protected themselves? See the difference between prevention and mitigation.
6. Intelligence versus information. I often hear professionals claim they have "intelligence" on adversary, when in fact they don't. Most often they have only raw information they haven't vetted or analyzed. These colleagues suffer from the correlation paradigm where they mistakenly conclude correlating or parallel information to an event is the cause. In the analyst world, this is called "confirmation bias". You believe the information because it confirms what you believe. Intelligence is the product of taking that raw information, vetting its source, comparing and contrasting that data against previous data and assumptions, peer reviews, and a final reporting of that information with an analysis centered on critical thinking. A newspaper article in and of itself is not intelligence because it says something we already thought was true. That would be akin to treating Weekly World News' stories on aliens consulting a still-alive JFK on Elvis' newly proposed welcome-back world tour as intelligence because you're an Elvis-loving, conspiracy theorist who believes you're an alien-abductee.
   
   
7. Guard versus officer. I'm sure to stir up something here. Let me clarify: there is NOTHING wrong with being a "guard". However, traditionally, that word has gotten a bad reputation. Think "mall security guard". These guys can be awesome professionals but the title does tend to minimize the extraordinary amount of work it takes to protect the thousands of mall patrons and mall assets against a variety of threats daily. It also does little to note the authority which enables them to perform certain legal actions against those threats such as trespass advisements and in some cases, arrests. "Officer" denotes they are an extension management and not merely someone who stands a post. They represent the extent to which managers are willing to go to protect their assets and their customers.
   
   Recently, during a discussion with another friend from the military, I recalled a conversation about semantics with a person who worked in what was commonly referred to as the "chow hall". One day, I inquired why the name "chow hall" was such an insult to him. He explained "Do you guard planes or do you protect assets vital to national security? I don't cook chow. I cook meals which are nutritious as per my training. We're both professionals. I know people mean no harm but that term implies my food and what I do as a professional are sub-par and unworthy of a professional title, when that's not true." Vets, I hear the snickering. Stop laughing. But he had a point. One that wasn't lost on me.
   
   How your customers see a "guard":
   
   
   
   An image the term "security officer" typically conveys:
   
   
8. OSINT versus unclassified. I'm a huge supporter of open source intelligence (OSINT). This entails gathering intelligence from a variety of non-covert channels. This could include public radio, news broadcasts, social media, etc. I have noticed this word used to excuse what I believe to be gross violations of protecting classified or sensitive information. Let me explain. I certainly understand OSINT by its nature can come from unclassified channels. However, I also realize it does not negate professionals from their responsibility not to divulge information coupled with their "insider perspective" which may be tactically advantageous to an adversary. You can observe this lack of professionalism best on social media, during a critical incident. There's seems to be a pandemic of sorts when these incidents happen which encourages its victims to feed their egos by talking endlessly about their highly sensitive "insider knowledge". I, once, observed someone who is widely considered an "expert" tweet the locations of responding forces to a major hostage situation. Another person tweeted security measures at a base they just left. Sure, none of this was classified because it came from a radio scanner and personal experience. It was, nonetheless, highly sensitive and could have placed lives at risk, if the adversary had intercepted these messages. In the physical security, once sensitive information is compromised, we only have a precious, small amount of time to deploy mitigators. As I'm often say during these events, "Don't let your ego and mouth write checks your a-- can't afford to cash with someone else's collateral."
   
   

   We've moved a table to barricade the door into this room. pic.twitter.com/FXj33EynxE
   — Federico Barillas S. (@fgbarillas) October 3, 2013

9. Active shooter versus mass killing. The best way to explain this is simply stating not every active shooter kills anyone and not every mass killing involves a gun. Yet, whether because of politics or hype, professionals and laymen still confuse these two. This may seem meaningless until you realize how information is gathered to study these two distinct events and the influence those studies have on policy.
   
10. Security theater versus threat mitigation. Look, folks, as professionals, we realize not every threat is going to attack us. We also get some of our measures are extreme. I'm certainly NOT trying to justify any abuses of authority or trust. That being said, just because you don't see the "boogey-man" doesn't mean he's not there. Does this mean security should have authority to do cavity searches on everyone? No. But it doesn't mean because that's extreme that someone isn't trying to do you harm. Do some threats get blown out of proportion? You bet. A vigilant public and other professionals are awesome checks against overreach, though. As every threat isn't realistic, every threat mitigator isn't security theater. We'd all do well keeping this in mind.

There are a load of others I would add but I feel as though this list does a great job of illustrating the power of words in our industry. Please use them carefully. If you have more, let me know.

INFOGRAPHIC: The Most Homicidal Countries

INFOGRAPHIC: The Freakonomics of Drug Dealing

Explore more visuals like this one on the web's largest information design community - Visually.

25 Items Every Security Professional Should Carry On-Site In Case S--- Hits The Fan

A picture of my "get-home bag"

I had the privilege of working as a private security officer as one of my first jobs after getting out of the military. I did this job in one of the most disaster-prone areas of the country - Florida. During my training and my time spent with coworkers and supervisors, I had many conversations about our duty to remain on-site during a natural disaster. These conversations had me asking many introspective questions about my own personal preparedness to fulfill this obligation. I knew I was highly trained and very skilled in providing the best protection possible for our clients. I was more concerned with the stark contrasts between my preparedness from when I did similar work in the military versus this new arena as a civilian. In the military, my post was equipped with gas mask, Chemical Biological Nuclear Radiation Explosive suits, food rations, radio, and a huge support network. As a civilian, I had none of these to face similar threats. It was this realization that sparked my determination to "prep".

"Prepping" is the application of various disaster preparedness concepts for personal and group survival in the event of a disaster. It's that simple. No Rambo survivalist fantasies stereotypes. Just people who want to better prepare for disasters in order to survive. With that in mind, "prepping" seems to be one of the most overlooked portions of the security officer's toolkit. Most agencies assign you a standard list of mandatory you need just to make it through a standard duty day. My hope is to provide you with a guide to get you through those not-so-standard duty days.

1. Flashlights. This goes without saying almost but I HIGHLY recommend carrying at least two more flashlights. In the picture above you will note two flashflights. I keep one for map reading and other minimum distance tasks. The other I use for longer distance tasks such as room clearing, site exploration, target acquisition, and signaling.
2. Compass, binoculars, and maps. Loads of security guys will carry the flashlight and maybe a knife and first aid kit. Few see the utility of having additional roadmaps and a compass. These tools are valuable for a variety of reasons in disaster scenarios that range from giving directions and position location to rescuers, navigation from one point on-site to another, and mapping terrain features and other locations as temporary shelter locations should they be needed.
3. Knives. I can't overstate why having a knife is a good thing in a disaster. There's practically an encyclopedia's worth of knowledge of the best utilities for a knife. I won't go over any of them here. However, I would like to specify the types of knives you should consider. I carry a defensive knife, three multi-tool knives, and a hunter's knife. These knives each serve a multitude of purposes and have served me in more ways than I can articulate in this space. Suffice it to say, if you don't get how these could benefit you in a disaster, then I suggest you get yourself in a situation where you need to cut, pry, hold, clamp, or stab something without them.
4. Notepad. Keep a notepad handy should you need to keep track of people in your area, emergency responders you've made contact with, how many people are on-site, etc. Anything and everything you feel you need to keep track of you should use this notepad for.
5. Tape. In my photo, you will notice electrical tape. I keep this tape in my kit mostly because this is my go-to tape for work and I keep it in the bag I take with me most in the field. It's also handy to have in my car for various vehicle breakdown scenarios. Before you ask, I also keep duct tape handy. It's another bag but I do have it and would use it over the electrical tape. The most important thing for security officers to note are the practical uses tape could have in a survival situation. In most cases, we use tape to keep things stuck together. There are a few more uses for tape other than this. I have used tape to close bandages, mark areas I cleared, hastily label items, etc. Just like knives, tape is another subject where the uses in a disaster are too large to discuss here. To say the least, if you don't already, keep some tape in your gear.
6. Cottonballs. I keep cottonballs in my kit for two reasons. The first is to have it to use as a dressing for wounds. The other is to use it for kindling in case a fire is needed. You may scoff at the idea of needing a fire in a standard duty. However, remember this list is for those non-standard duty days.
7. Whistle. It's a secondary communication device.
8. Lighter and "strike-anywhere" matches.
9. Signalling mirror. This is another communication device.
10. Address book. I keep all of the important numbers and information I may need in case cell service is out or my phone is dead. Most people are caught off-guard by how fast cell services goes out in disaster scenarios. Having a copy of your most important numbers is very important. You should consider having the numbers for:
    (a) Your local police and fire departments
    (b) Your home numbers and those of family members you may need to inform.
    (c) Your employer's numbers
    (d) The National Weather Service Dial-A-Forecast for your local area
    (e) 511 and 311. This will provide local government information and traffic information.
    (f) Local friends who may have some situational awareness about what's happening.
11. Debris mask. This is no substitute for a full respirator or gas mask but it could prove vital if the need arises.
12. Gloves. I normally carry both latex and work gloves. The latext I use to mitigate exposure to bloodborne pathogens, while I use the work gloves to mitigate exposure to various temperature fluctuations, rain, sharp or abrasive materials, and to gain better traction when gripping certain objects.
13. Paracord. Seriously, I don't have enough space in the world to discuss paracord. Get educated on how useful just a few feet can be, if you're not already, and I guarantee you'll be carrying it daily as a part of your kit.
14. Basic tools. Screwdriver with multiple bits and a hex lock tool. Also, if your bag allows, consider carrying a hammer and camp axe.
15. Emergency blanket.
16. Miniature towel.
17. Portable poncho.
18. Basic first aid kit with bandages, supplies for tourniquets, and other items you have been trained to use in a medical situation.
19. Food. I pack food for sustainment and morale purposes. In other words, in my kit, you will find food for meals like MREs and other high calorie food meals and morale like snacks and some candies. Anyone who has ever had to eat the same meal over and over again or who has to "stretch" a meal out over a few days knows the power having some variety in between can have on your morale.
20. Water and purification tablets. The water goes without saying. There could be a situation when you're stuck on site but with limited water options. Having water on hand and having the ability to purify the available water on-site will ensure you're meeting one of the most important survival needs.
21. Clothes. Ever been on a patrol and got rained on? I have and the impact it has on you physically and mentally is taxing. Physically, you can suffer from hypothermia and all the ugliness associated with that. Mentally, there is nothing better than knowing you can periodically change clothes if needed. Anyone who has ever been rained on during a foot patrol can attest to this.
22. Boots. See clothes.
23. Rucksack or versatile tactical bag. The bag you see pictured above is what my wife has deemed my "tactical man-bag". All joking aside, having a good bag to store your gear is of the utmost important. If you don't or can't go with a bag, then I suggest obtaining a pouch wherein you can carry your basic personal survival stuff in a pocket or some other storage compartment. You should test any bag to its limit. My recommendation, if your budget can handle it, buy a rucksack from the folks at GoRuck and evaluate the bag through their course. I have been meaning to do a GoRuck Challenge just for this purpose. No better way to see how your bag holds up other than through some stress. GoRuck puts on challenges that will do just that and give you some idea as to where you stand with another critical survival tool.
    
24. Conditioning. I hated this word in high school. It meant long runs and grumpy coaches. It also meant I would be better prepared for whatever the opponents threw at us that season. The same goes with disaster prep. You should be engaging in enough physical activities daily to prepare yourself for situations wherein your body could easily be the leading cause of death. Remember the first rule in the movie Zombieland was Cardio.
    
25. Train. The items on this are dependent on the most important tool you always carry with you - your mind. Please, don't buy any of the items on this list unless you feel you can adequately use them to save your life or the lives of others. In other words, if you don't know how to use the tool, find some training to figure it out or practice with the tools until you get it right. These items require the same amount of dedication to master as your firearm or other relevant security tools. 

This list is by no means all-inclusive. I will admit I have missed some very important stuff. However, I think I have covered the basics. Let me know if you have any other items you would suggest security officers carry should they find themselves in a disaster situation.

Video: The Story of Glenn Duffie Shriver - Student, Chinese Spy

Many times, when we hear the Chinese have recruited spies on US soil, they are normally Chinese-American scientists. Like most foreign intelligence services (FIS), the Chinese realized it would be much more valuable to have someone who could get inside the Central Intelligence Agency who perhaps wasn't Chinese-American. Meet Glenn Duffie Shriver, a Michigan college student Beijing recruited to join the CIA in 2007. Although he failed to matriculate into the agency, he was paid over $70,000 to do so. American counterintelligence discovered this recruitment and prosecuted Shriver. Subsequently, in 2010, he was sentenced to four years in federal prison for committing espionage for a foreign government. The video above describes Shriver's recruitment, the consequences of his actions, and subsequent attempts by the Chinese to recruit agents from backgrounds similar to Shriver's.

Here are some resources to learn more about Shriver:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Glenn_Duffie_Shriver

http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/wfo012111.htm

http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/chinas-mole-in-training/

http://www.hanford.gov/c.cfm/oci/ci_spy.cfm?dossier=162

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/april/students-abroad-warned-of%20foreign-intelligence-threat/video-glenn-duffie-shriver-describes-experience

How And Why Mass Violence At Schools Happen

There's been yet another act of mass violence at a school and, or course, the media has lost its mind. People are wondering how this could have happened and why. As security professionals, these questions are not new and nor is the answer. For those in the field, bear with me, I'm going to over how and why these things happen.

1. It has nothing to do with WHO at times and more with WHERE. Let me explain. We always assume people target us because we mistakenly believe the target is "special" to the attacker in some sort of way. This is a common theme in our attempts to understand attacker methodology with respect to terrorism. All over electronic punditry, we're saturated with folks who proclaim "they attack us because they hate us." So this has become our mantra for every attack of any variety. What we fail to account for is that it's not entirely exclusive as to who they attack but where. On Twitter, I have been practically shouting when it comes to mass violence, one of the most key ingredients, if not the key ingredient, is the presence of crowds. Nothing is more appetizing to an attacker but to make his attack seem grand and above-average for a swath of reasons I'm not qualified to adequately explain here. Let's just say, you should NEVER EVER be surprised by the actions of mentally disturbed people.
   
   Crowds are also, normally, not difficult to get large casualty numbers from. Think about the last time you were at baseball game or major sporting event. Ever notice the large crowd at the ticket or embarkation areas. As a security professional, whether you're working or not, this is perhaps one of the most precarious chokepoints to be at. A chokepoint is a place where people have no other choice to be at in order to go some place. Everyone working anything from Secret Service to convoy security will tell you to ALWAYS avoid chokepoints. Why? They offer the presence of crowds, very narrow escapes for victims, and the ability of attackers to conceal themselves in the crowd.
2. Violence has very little to do with the tools. Think about that for a second. I have made it no secret I enjoys guns. I do. However, I also understand the temptation to want to ban them. I've seen the statistics and the simulated models in whitepapers from folks who have never fired a gun or actually witnessed violence. I have a problem with this overly simplistic conceptualization of the problem. Erroneously, we believe the issue is with the mass proliferation of guns. Unfortunately, the discussion rarely acknowledges the socioeconomic, psychological, political, and cultural issues that drive some violence. More importantly, we ignore what mankind has known for decades - you can ban the tool but violence will always remain and the loss of any life is intolerable. Do you think if mankind had no guns he wouldn't find a better way to commit acts of violence? Think about that for a second. We had no electric chair until Thomas Edison did a proof-of-concept demonstration to show the dangers of electricity. Man will always find ways to commit acts of violence against one another for whatever reason it deems fit. This is not to say we can't have mitigators in place but we can't for one second believe we're getting rid of the problem solely with a ban of the tools or knee-jerk "reforms".
3. People mistakenly use "mitigation" and "prevention" interchangeably. Security professionals understand the difference between the two. Websters defines "mitigate" as "to make (something) less severe, harmful, or painful". Many people believe we can prevent acts of mass violence "if only we do X,Y, or Z." There's a huge fallacy that we can prevent crime. This comes from a sublime arrogance of humans who believe we can stop our fellow man from acting out against us.
   
   The issue may seem to be one of semantics but I argue that it's not. You can't "prevent" me from speeding. Only I can do that. I used an analogy the other day where I articulated, "Just as Match.com doesn't make marriages, you can't "prevent" crime. You can set conditions with good mitigators but ultimately the decision to move forward or stop is on the principle actor(s)." Think about that for a second. No matter what measures you put in place, whether it's a guard at a school or metal detectors, my ability to accomplish the task of killing a large amount of people at a particular location is solely left to my motivation, intelligence, ability, and imagination.
   
   I have long argued that we have to move away from the idea that we can "prevent" crime to one where we "mitigate" attacks. A while back, I said people mistakenly believe by locking a door that somehow they have thwarted a burglary without seeing any firsthand information a burglar attacked the door and left because it was locked. Yet, everyday, most of us lock our doors anyway thinking we're doing crime "prevention" when in fact we're doing crime "mitigation". Mass violence occurs many times because we mistakenly believe our mitigators can prevent it.
4. We rely too heavily on certain mitigation tools. Having an armed guard at a location is a mitigator not a prevention tool. The guard is there to ensure you have the means to adequately respond to acts of violence until police arrive. School administrators have for far too long relied on guards as prevention tools and have stopped doing other things which are more effective in mitigating these acts like deploying good cameras, training personnel on monitoring camera feeds, practicing lockdown procedures with teachers and other staff during non-working hours, talking with local police about their capabilities, training staff on conflict deescalation, and paying attention to warning signs.
5. We don't train staff on attack methodology and psychology in school. Teachers and other staff are often taught how to respond to these events which is great. However, solely doing this ignores how often teachers and staff are the best sensors we have to students who may be a danger. Many times, they may observe a student doing reconnaissance or testing security and not even know it. Imagine how many lives could be saved if teachers and staff had a threat working group chaired with the school safety official and principal in schools where these incidents have taken place.  
6. We used to do a really good job of being very proactive with mental health incidents in this country. I'm not advocating going back to asylums. Most were wrought with abuse and shoddy practices. No, what I want is for us to become much more proactive with mental health. We can no longer see mentally ill people as "someone else's problem". Mass violence has taught us we can no longer think of it like this. Yet, we do. When we removed the ability of doctors and other mental health professionals to intervene immediately and possibly treat long-term issues, we placed our citizens at risk. How? When most seriously mentally disturbed people come to the attention of authorities, it is often too late and the nature for how long and where they can be adequately be treated has greatly diminished. In some jurisdictions, the police can only place you on a "mental health hold" at a local mental health facility for 72 hours or less, in many cases. If you don't exhibit the behavior further and can be treated, you're out.
   
   As a former law enforcement officer, I can tell you the most distressful call to go to is a mental health one. Given that most mental health hospitalizations are never found (either because they can't legally or no measures exists to enable it) on background checks for firearms, the problem grows exponentially worse. Many of those who have committed acts of mass violence had already been diagnosed as being seriously mentally ill but couldn't be put in long-term care because they hadn't been deemed a danger and even if they had, I'm unaware if this would have barred them from having firearms (as discussed previously, I'm not sure a ban for them would have been effective in preventing violence in some instances).

I understand this list is not all-inclusive but this is how I see the problem in a more condensed manner than I believe can be adequately addressed on a forum such as this. You may have other solutions or know of other ideas. As always, they are greatly appreciated.

KiteString - A Web App That Could Save Your Life

I'm all about the use of automated tools as force multipliers in security. Whether you're protecting your home or office, you can always benefit from having an automated tool to help you out. Just remember the biggest vulnerability begins with the user. The folks at KiteString have done an awesome job of creating a wonderful web application that could actually save your life.

KiteString is a check-in service, wherein you create a list of contacts, a check-in phrase (optional), and a duress word (also optional). You also supply the service with your estimated time of arrival to your location. When you fail to check-in via text, the app will notify your emergency contacts.

Who can benefit from a service like this?

• Victims of domestic violence
• Stalking victims
• People concerned with overt threats against their lives (witnesses in criminal cases)
• Parents of children who travel or who are mobile
• Senior citizens who need to notify their children should they not arrive somewhere
• Security enthusiasts
• Private investigators

When coupled with tools like Tasker, Guardly, Locale, and now, KiteString, the possibilities are endless what you can do with respect to emergency notifications. I'll be doing some side projects with this service to see what else you can do with other tools working in conjunction with KiteString.

Guess Who Is In The Freedom Of Information Act Business

Folks, I don't claim to be a journalist, though I give unsolicited advice to them on Twitter. I know I shouldn't. I'm supposed to be in my lane. However, I do recognize when they go about using the law to get official documents about things the government likes to keep secret. I respect this so much that I began doing the same a while back through MuckRock.com. MuckRock is a Freedom of Information Act request clearinghouse where journalists, bloggers, and fellow netizens use FOIA to gain access to documents. I do this mainly to educate myself on physical security issues. I've decided to begin sharing my requests and those of others I find worth following.

Here are a few of my pending requests:

• Customs Billing Invoices & Activities Documents - 02/19/2014
• Department of the Interior Security Docs - 02/20/2014
• Threats Against Jesse Jackson - 05/22/2013

Here are a few of the requests where I was successful in getting information:

• ACCESS: Automated Comparison and Clustering of Entity Signatures - 05/22/2013
• Equipment Issued to Department of Education OIG - 08/06/2013
• MRAP Sales  - 05/13/2013

You can sign up for an account at MuckRock and submit your own FOIA requests through them. The only caveat is whatever you find or get from the government, MuckRock will publish on their site. So exercise due caution with phone numbers, SSN information, etc. Also, as you will learn, if it's a really good secret, the government will fight you "tooth and nail". Luckily, MuckRock has a pretty good team that will work with you. Also, don't worry about staying on top of the government with requests, MuckRock has a nag feature wherein they bug the government almost bi-weekly with respect to your requests. These folks are great at what they do.

You can use MuckRock via the link below

http://www.muckrock.com

Or you can do your own requests via the official US government FOIA requests. Just be aware, your state and local jurisdictions have their own sites as well. Try them for a more localized search. 

http://www.foia.gov

I will continue to post more documents and updates regarding what I find. Stay tuned.

Security Officer Memorial

My latest post directed toward those who consider themselves "security professionals" got me to thinking about some of the ways we, in this profession, often fail to recognize the sacrifices of those who have worn the uniform and shield. So I decided to do something about it in my own small way. I created a wall using information derived from the fine folks at Private Officer to memorialize those who have made that sacrifice. I will update the wall as I get information. Feel free to check it often when you feel yourself becoming more unsure about what this profession entails.

The wall can be found on the right-hand (your right) side of this site. Here's the permalink - http://blog.thesecuritydialogue.org/p/security-officers-killed-in-line-of.html

Quote of the Week

Today's quote of the week comes from one of my favorite tweeps and fellow security aficionado The Grugq. Pretty much sums it up.

@GoddamGeek no. The meaning of privacy and security are context sensitive and defined by the user. It becomes a semantic debate
— the grugq (@thegrugq) April 7, 2014

The Security Professional's Creed

After my latest post, I started to think about what it means to be a "security professional". I use this title on my personal emails and how I describe my passion to others. I find most people, to include fellow "professionals", are pretty unclear what a "security professional" actually is or should be doing. So I decided to create a creed I think summarizes what we believe, practice, and require as professionals. Let me know what you think.

1. I am a security professional. I will provide protection when requested or required. I will do this to best of my ability and will ensure my fellow professionals, sub-contractors, and employees do the same. I will work within the parameters you give but I will not sacrifice quality and how I ensure you and your assets are adequately protected.
2. I am a security professional. I have an amazing legacy. I come from Pinkerton, the Bow Street Runners, and Robert Peele. Society is safe and secure because men and women like me and my team have stood watch over the things and people others have said needed protection. We have done this dutifully and often with great sacrifice. In my field, there are no long funeral processions when we lose someone "on the job". There's no horse-drawn carriage. If we're "lucky", there's an article in the paper. Yet, here I stand ready, willing, and more than capable to make that sacrifice if need be.
3. I am a security professional. I may not be a gun-toter or a patrolman. I may be the guy working on your firewall or doing your annual risk assessment. I may be the guy in the parking lot you ignore as you hurry to your office while I stand watch in the cold, rain, and insanely hot. I may be the guy walking around your child's school to keep out drug dealers and other criminals. I may be the private investigator you call when your wife is charged with a DUI. I may be the private investigator you call when the police have failed and you need a lead in tracking down a missing child. I may be the 24 year old security officer who takes up someone else's patrol sector for the night and is mercilessly killed because I asked for an ID. I am a security professional.
4. I am a security professional. I am not a guard dog though I may use them on occasion to protect you. I am not your maid or baggage handler though I am happy to work alongside them in protecting you. I am an enabler. I ensure what I need to do doesn't impede on your ability to do what you need to do.  I am not an obstacle nor am I a nuisance. I am a professional.
5. I am a security professional. I have a variety of experiences and I've been educated by a school where the lessons learned are taught in measurements of life or death. Just not anyone can do what I do. It's hard. I'm a security professional.
6. I am a security professional. I take detailed notes, draw sketches, outline terrain features, study the threat inside and out, meet with stakeholders to address risk management, and I know the things you want protected most and where you're most vulnerable. I'm on-time to meetings. I dress professionally. I address you by terms of address you're familiar with and requested. These are big responsibilities I shoulder alone with my team. We are always adapting to your protection needs. Why? Because I'm a security professional.
7. I am security professional. Yet, I make mistakes. I may try my best but there will be a few isolated times where I forget something. While you're upset, I am even more mad that it happened. You see, I'm disciplined. When I'm in the workplace, I don't engage in office gossip. I strive to manage my personal life so it doesn't conflict with my professional life. I ask for help when needed and I seek opportunities to grow. I treat what I do as a profession and not a "job". I am security professional.
8. I am a security professional. I may not be a security "expert". As a matter of fact, I'm uncomfortable with the term. I know most "experts" are only good at one thing - convincing you they're an "expert". I don't have all the answers but I know where to find them. You could very well have a situation that I'm not familiar or equipped to deal with. When this happens, I will transfer the task to someone else who knows better than I and I will "shadow" them until I am. I am a security professional.
9. I am a security professional. I may be a guard, officer, manager, agent, director, or chief, but, at the end of the day, I am a professional. I treat this as a profession and I demand you do as well. I ensure my team and I adhere to the highest standard. Our job demands it. Countless lives depend on me and my team being effective mitigators every day in the event the threat shows up. We are prepared to detect, deter, delay and if needed, destroy the threat. We will do this and more. We are security professionals.

OPINION: Why Your Terrorism Expert Isn't A Security Expert Always

I know some of you already know the answer to this. Just bear with me while I explain it to those who seem confused. First, let's begin with telling you why I'm even bothering. Through various social media accounts I participate on, I have come across folks who seem to believe their education and/or sort-of-relative experience makes them experts in physical security. As I have explained earlier, I am certainly not qualified to call myself an expert but I have a swath of experience and knowledge that allows me to adequately determine someone's expertise in my field. Because of this, I have run across a many of people who the media and others have extolled as subject matter experts on everything from active shooters to in-depth espionage cases. It seems the loftier the person's former or current professional title is the more they seem to call on them to give their commentary. As you might imagine, I have become angry and dismayed by what I have perceived as reckless de facto expertise certifications given to people who are often woefully unqualified. Let me explain:

1. Just because you were Special Forces or even a spy doesn't mean you're an expert on all-things related to security. I LOVE special operations folks. They do stuff other people can't and only dream of doing in the name of God, country, and duty. They are elite and deserve all of the praise and accolades that come from doing awesome work in their field. Let me explain. I'm not taking anything away from people who could kill me from a thousand yards away or who kill bad people in far away lands. However, not every special operations person knows about alarm systems, CCTV, CPTED, security operations, video analytics, or a host of other things I cover here to the level where they are the only people qualified to speak on physical security matters. Some do because their mission may require it. Just like I'm familiar with special operations because I had a job that required some knowledge of them doesn't mean that I'm an "expert" in special operations. This doesn't stop our media and a few Fortune 500 companies from proclaiming some of these folks who "look and sound the part", yet have never worked a single security project, as experts.
2. They have a Ph.D in Middle Eastern Literature and Art and know about every major terrorist attack in the region and have a blog their peers think is top-notch. Coincidentally, they know everything there is about active shooters, CCTV footage, small arms, and small unit tactics. Folks, seriously, after every active shooter event, spy story, or terrorist attack, there's a deluge of these folks through my various social media feeds. These are excellent folks in their field. They've got more education and background in studying terrorism than I could ever dream to have. Many of them are great people who only want to share knowledge. For those who have done that with me, I'm extremely grateful. However, there's another segment of this population who often come across as belittling in their demeanor. I appreciate all opinions. I truly do. I won't even pretend like I know everything (even on things where I may know a bit more than I let on) because I don't. I enjoy discourse and exchange of ideas. What grates on mine and other security professionals' nerves are non-native academic "experts" who come as though your opinions are somewhat flawed because you haven't taken their course or written a paper on it. I'm sorry - I got my experience in the field and learned what little I do know by seeing the world through the lens of a person actually doing the job you allude to know so much about but never did.
3. They've read a bunch of blogs, some books, seen a few DEFCON talks, and follow some guys who pick locks. Sounds legit. That's great. But that doesn't make them an expert. In my opinion, expertise is derived from a multitude of professional experiences and in some cases, academic knowledge on the topic. I appreciate their enthusiasm but they can call me when they've suffered their first physical breach from an armed adversary at a facility the've been entrusted to protect. The world I operate in is much different than those books, articles, DEFCON or TED talks could convey adequately. That doesn't mean their opinion isn't worthy. I wouldn't dream of making that kind of determination. In your dialogue with professionals in this field, don't assume things you've read about physical security related topics are true or accurate. Assume you may not know everything either. If you're a reporter, never assume because a guy wrote a book on terrorism he understands why a 15 year old boy shoots up his school. Take into account not everything that goes boom in America was made because "they hate freedom".
4. Your "security expert/guru/prophet" is a cyber-security dude who does encryption, firewalls, and IDS. That's great. But just like I know basic stuff about that stuff, unless they've worked on or designed physical security systems or apparatus, that doesn't necessarily make them an "expert" either. Chances are they've also never done a bag search, searched a vehicle for IEDs, detained shoplifters, or a host of other events physical security professionals have had to encounter. In the cyber world, they're awesome. This does not mean they understand burglaries, forced entry, active shooters, or property trespassers, though some may.
5. They've been referred to as a "security expert" but their experience is almost invisible. I've seen major corporations shell out some serious money to make guys who "sound smart" about security the "face" of their security initiatives. This is VERY bad. It undermines the strides we've made in this industry to standardize what it means to have expertise in this field, when major companies assign people as their "subject matter experts" when they have minimal experience doing anything in security. If I just touched a hammer yesterday for the first time, would you make me the foreman of the crew building a high-rise today? 
6. Your expert has certifications. I'm not impressed. Actually, that's not entirely true. If your expert has certifications that they earned, I'm impressed. The American Society of Industrial Security, Inc. does an awesome job of certifying people based on merit and performance. This is why their certifications are the best in the industry to have, in my opinion (and a few others). I'm not saying everyone else's certification is bad. Some are really good. I'm thinking of getting a few non-ASIS certifications myself. However, let's not be naive. There are certifications you can buy to make yourself seem more qualified than you are. This is dangerous yet is also HIGHLY ignored in some instance. The best place to witness this disgusting hoax is on LinkedIn. I LOVE LinkedIn but there are some profiles which are full of self-aggrandizement. Don't believe the hype, folks. Do your due diligence.
7. Your expert is a former cop who never did security details when he was working and his degree is in a non-related field. Being a cop is VERY cool. I'm a bit prejudiced but I think cops are more diversified than we acknowledge. That being said, I have found where security managers are former cops (those looking for a post-retirement job) who haven't worked security prior, they have found the transition to be more difficult than they or management may have imagined. The personnel, the jurisdiction size, and overall authority are different. The mission is also different. Yet I have seen companies hire people from law enforcement solely because management sees an intersection of subject matter expertise which may not even exist. Law enforcement and security are different species of the same animal in some respects.

I hope no one takes offense to this post. I'm just a bit wary of countless people peppering social media with facts and ideas which are unfounded and dangerous. Most times, these people are ignorant of the damage they're doing. Many believe that "expertise" is a subjective term and they have as much credibility as anyone else to give their commentary to masses they believe need to hear it. This is all very true. I have almost no issues with this. Many of them didn't want to be considered "experts". Often, there is a void of "experts" for the media and others to call on and so the people who "sound the part" get called. Perhaps, we need to move beyond our acceptance of "anyone can do security" to one where we recognize and respect the professionalism that is required to do this job and those who actually do it.