CCTV Camers, Crime, and San Francisco

The San Francisco Chronicle has written an article about a recent study at UC Berkly of SF's 60 CCTV cameras. Researchers looked at over 59, 000 crimes which occurred within 1, 000 feet of cameras between 1 January 2005 to 28 January 2008. What I found ironic was the discovery that the researchers found most violent crime around the cameras at 250 feet or less had decreased. The further you went away from the cameras the more crime. Wow. That's a novel concept. I'm not saying the researchers were inept at understanding basic criminal methodology but this does seem a bit odd.

Even odder was this comment in the article:

The only cameras' only positive effect appears to be the 22 percent drop in property crime within 100 feet of the cameras, though people broke into cars parked near the cameras at the same rate as they did before the cameras were installed, according to the study released today.

I'm not a fan of technology being a "save-all" in crime prevention but I find it very incredulous that a non-criminal justice professional would not understand the positive effect CCTV's have when properly utilized. Again, I go back to my previous statements about CCTV systems; They are only as good their operators and the money and expertise to maintain and upgrade then.

Crime relocation is not the same as crime prevention . By moving, it does provide some areas enough time to rebound and bring back positive ideas, people, and activities. So just because crime moved doesn't mean that was necessarily a bad thing. I'm sure the residents and cops who live and/or work on those streets where the crime moved from would tell you they welcome the break.

Crazy FBI Child Pornographers!!

So, I'm glad the title caught your eyes. I've been a bit busy catching up on some professional obligations and finally made my way back to the blog. Let's take a look at this very interesting article from News.com.

The article details a supposed newly discovered technique the FBI is using to catch child pornographers. This new tactic involves "posting hyperlinks that purport to be illegal videos of minors having sex, and then raiding the homes of anyone willing to click on them." Worried the FBI is putting out its own version of porn to catch these guys? Don't worry because the supposed video files actually were gibberish and contained no illegal images. This is a technique most p2p investigators use to catch pirates.

There is legal precedence to use such tactics but it does raise some very interesting questions about entrapment and privacy. Just who did the FBI nab with this technique?

Roderick Vosburgh, a doctoral student at Temple University who also taught history at La Salle University, was raided at home in February 2007 after he allegedly clicked on the FBI's hyperlink. Federal agents knocked on the door around 7 a.m., falsely claiming they wanted to talk to Vosburgh about his car. Once he opened the door, they threw him to the ground outside his house and handcuffed him.

Vosburgh was charged with violating federal law, which criminalizes "attempts" to download child pornography with up to 10 years in prison. Last November, a jury found Vosburgh guilty on that count, and a sentencing hearing is scheduled for April 22, at which point Vosburgh could face three to four years in prison.

Sounds like a cool idea right? You catch bad people who you can prove had an intent to view that material they believed to be on your site which they were led to believe would be child pornography. You get the address of your perpetrator and go arrest him/her.

Any one else see a potential problem? Well, you're not alone. A lot of people find it disturbing that all the FBI and/or any other law enforcement agency has to do is register a domain name and flaunt it through its name or hype as a safe harbor for individuals who may want to see this. The problem which lies in that is what happens to someone who say mistakenly enters the wrong URL and gets the FBI's sting site address. Not to mention how easily another person who get the address, thinks it may not be what it advertises, and "rickroll's" an adversary to that URL. For those of you unaware of "rickrolling", its when you're told in a message a link will take you to a page about flowers (which you want to see) and it then takes you to a Rick Astley video.

I know what you're thinking, "I'm legal beagle but even I can recognize this sort of law enforcement tactic is based on very thin layers of the law." So far, at least, attorneys defending the hyperlink-sting cases do not appear to have raised unlawful entrapment as a defense.

"Claims of entrapment have been made in similar cases, but usually do not get very far," said Stephen Saltzburg, a professor at George Washington University's law school. "The individuals who chose to log into the FBI sites appear to have had no pressure put upon them by the government...It is doubtful that the individuals could claim the government made them do something they weren't predisposed to doing or that the government overreached."

The outcome may be different, Saltzburg said, if the FBI had tried to encourage people to click on the link by including misleading statements suggesting the videos were legal or approved.

In the case mentioned previously, the prosecuotr relied on the federal child pornography law, which states the definition of "sexually explicit conduct" does not require that sex acts take place):

The first image depicted a pre-pubescent girl, fully naked, standing on one leg while the other leg was fully extended leaning on a desk, exposing her genitalia... The other image depicted four pre-pubescent fully naked girls sitting on a couch, with their legs spread apart, exposing their genitalia. Viewing this image, the jury could reasonably conclude that the four girls were posed in unnatural positions and the focal point of this picture was on their genitalia.... And, based on all this evidence, the jury found that the images were of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and certainly did not require a crystal clear resolution that defendant now claims was necessary, yet lacking.

The article also states, "Harvey Silverglate, a longtime criminal defense lawyer in Cambridge, Mass. and author of a forthcoming book on the Justice Department, replied: 'Because the courts have been so narrow in their definition of 'entrapment,' and so expansive in their definition of 'probable cause,' there is nothing to stop the Feds from acting as you posit.'"

Hiding In Plain Sight

Do you ever have one of those conversations where you come up with a pretty remarkable revelation? I had such a revelation yesterday with my wife. We were discussing how good we both were at "hide and go seek". I'm sure we all discovered sooner or later it was much better to hide somewhere close to our "seekers" and in a place they would normally overlook. In other words, you have to "hide in plain sight". That thought found me no matter where I went this weekend. Getting a new birth certificate, burning your fingerprints, or playing dead seems a bit much like a semi-decent Hollywood movie. But the lessons are the same. Disguises don't work. Nothing works if you can't find a way to hide your real identity while you try to live your life as normal.

I know most of my security aficionados are probably somewhere asking, "Where's he going with this? And why discuss this in a public forum?". My answer to them is we should talk about this in the open because the bad guys already know what I'm telling you. In order to win at the proverbial game of "hide and go seek" in the security world, we must first think like our "hiders" and become much "seekers". For example, if you operate a CCTV system and need to know how to spot shoplifters and other rogue parties, I would begin to look at the ways in which they often try to appear as normal as possible such as dress and appearance, behavior, and demeanor. If you get a guy in an aisle who's trying his best to appear normal when in fact he is far from it, then hopefully you'll recognize this is as a "critical indicator".

I've attached a video I thought was relevant to this topic. Most fugitives evade capture by learning how to camouflage themselves with multiple behavioral patterns which suit their new identities. In the security disciplines, we find this sort of subterfuge with spies and terrorists. In order to gain the advantage, we must learn what mistakes someone like this would make. Maybe, their behavior will lead us to believe something is not quite right. Good cops know what these mistakes look like. If you've been to any escape and evasion course, you know this is one of the first things they teach. If you don't have this skill, might I recommend a good game of "hide and go seek" with your favorite five year old. I know it sounds strange but the games we play as children always come back to us as adults.