Why Attacking The Grid Became Hip & What We Can Do About it

In April 2013, a group of armed men attacked 17 Bay-area power substations in an effort to presumably disrupt power to neighboring business. The attack was carried out using 7.62 rounds which are commonly used in AK-47s (and its variants) as well as numerous other rifles namely certain sniper rifles such as the M-24 depicted below. The attacks were said to be carried out with military precision as the attackers both shot at the transformers and breached the underground area where various power cables were located.

I've also attached the surveillance video of these attacks so you can get an idea of how they occurred.




Much has been pontificated on exactly who could have carried out such an attack. Former Federal Regulatory Commission Chairman John Wellinghoff stated he believed the attacks were a "terrorist act" even though the FBI has said to various media outlets they don't see any evidence of that now. As an investigator and a former military police officer, I can tell you when law enforcement says they "don't see any evidence supporting that", that does exclude any suspicions they might have. My preliminary guesstimate is the FBI has some idea as to who the perpetrators are especially given the investigation is several months old and we're approaching a year since the attacks occurred.

I have heard from various sources this was the work of animal rights groups or environmentalist, given the target selection and court convictions of members of those groups in attacks against similar targets despite the methodology being completely different from the Bay-area attacks. For the record, I completely disagree with this supposition, as it eliminates several other groups who are just as capable and have just as much stake in pulling off this kind of attack. As a matter of fact, I find it odd those who suspect environmentalist/animal rights connections would ignore the attackers would choose a methodology using firearms which goes against one of the strongest weapons going for them - the lack of human casualties and kinetic attacks which harm human beings. Think about what I'm saying here for a second. Why would you bring a gun to an op where you could be discovered by law enforcement if the weapon isn't going to be useful as a defensive weapon against them? Also, any of these groups would have to account for the damage done to their public image if discovered with sniper rifles. It certainly makes it easy for their opponents to call them "enemies of the state".

What I surmise, rather amateurishly, is the perpetrators brought guns to do the damage and possibly, engage responding law enforcement. Thankfully, the latter never occurred I suspect because the suspects believed they had done enough damage. I am also of the opinion this was a dress rehearsal for a larger scale attack. Many groups do a dry-run before a major attack to test how the target and responders react. We see this all the time with bomb threats called in weeks before an attack. No suspicious device is found at first as the subjects observe reactions. They then rework the plan and decide whether to order another test. I know this because this is how I was taught to plan operations in the military and I suspect whoever is behind these attacks was taught the same lessons.

So why the power plants and why sniper attacks? Quite simply, because the security industry and our government partners have been discussing this since 2002. We've consistently asked that critical infrastructure beef up its security. Additionally, a report was done by the National Academy of Science describing the probability for success of a sniper attack against transformers. One could use the CARVER matrix to determine this is perhaps the more likely of any probable attack against critical infrastructure nodes. This is partially because of the ease of access to the target, lack of security at the target, its criticality (it is vital to the target's mission), and its recoverability.

My summation is the attackers didn't have much experience as a group with kinetic attacks and may have used this attack as a means to demonstrate some proof of concept. Whether there will be more attacks is still unknown. Given the hype surrounding this one, they may try again.

Here's what I propose power companies can do to protect their substations:

• Add 10 foot fencing around the perimeter of substations, ensure fence is encased in concrete at the bottom to prevent digging under the fence, and configure the barbed wire in a Y configuration.
• Have a roving armed security unit patrol actively in the area of transformers and substations conducting periodic but random security checks of the area. Have a randomizer pick the days and times of these attacks on a daily basis. Never keep the same schedule.
• Consider feeding the substation's closed circuit television feed into your state's emergency management agency or fusion cell incident management consoles.
• Emplace barriers throughout the avenues of approach to disrupt potential vehicle traffic to the substation. 
• Consider placing armoured steel on the transformers and other critical areas.
• Consider using seismographic security sensors and magnetic sensors along various vantage points.
• Conduct a foot patrol in the area as a part of your random checks I mentioned earlier. 
• Conduct a red team exercise yearly on your facilities to ensure personnel and security operators understand and implement sound practices to secure your assets in an attack.

As a caveat to the recommendation above, I fully realize this is not a fully comprehensive plan. The idea is to demonstrate how the power companies can implement various measures which are relatively less-complicated than might be assumed. If you have other recommendations, please post them below. I'd like to hear from folks from all over the industry.

Kenya Mall Shooting - Why It Went All Wrong & What We Can Do To Be Better

Yesterday, the New York City Police Department released a report from its SHIELD initiative about the Kenya mall shooting/terrorist attack. It was a pretty damning report to say the least. Before we talk about the report, let's talk about SHIELD is and why that's important to understand in the context of this report. SHIELD is the NYPD's homegrown information-sharing component with private sector security. It provides analysis on current and future threats. I've previously read some of SHIELD's reports. Some were good and some were typical of fusion center reports - some meat and some potatoes but not a full meal. This report was driven, in part, to go over what NYPD and private security could learn about what happened in Nairobi. There was plenty.

There were some startling revelations:

1. Kenyan police were VASTLY outgunned. The report states, "The typical Uniformed Kenyan Police Officer is not as well equipped as their western counterparts, typically only carrying a long gun, most commonly an AK-47 style rifle with a folding stock, loaded with a single 30 round magazine. They do not carry handguns, wear body armor, gun belts or have portable radios to communicate." Each of the terrorist were carrying 250 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. Lack of body armor and radios to communicate resulted in fratricide. More on that later.
2. Responding plainclothes officers were also outgunned and had no visible identification. Remember what I said about fratricide? From the report: "Very few of any of the plainclothes law enforcement first responders displayed any visible law enforcement identification such as a badge, arm band, ID card or  a raid jacket, making identification as “friend or foe” extremely difficult for other armed first responders."
3. Realizing the police were outgunned, Kenya made the incident response a military matter. That's as bad as it sounds. The report says, "Kenyan government officials decide to transfer the handling of this incident from the police to the military. A squad of Kenya Defense Forces KDF soldiers enters the mall and shortly afterwards, in a case of mistaken identity, the troops fired on the GSU-RC Tactical Team.They kill one police officer and wounding the tactical team commander. In the ensuing confusion both the police and military personnel pull out of the mall to tend to the casualties and re-group."
4. Responding military forces used an RPG-7 as a room clearing tool. I kid you not. And the destruction was insane. "It is reported that at some point during the day the Kenya Defense Forces decided to fire a high explosive anti-tank rocket (possibly a RPG-7 or an 84mm Recoilless Rifle) as part of their operation to neutralize the terrorists in the Nakumatt Super Market.The end result of this operation was a large fire and the partial collapse of the rear rooftop parking lot and two floors within the Nakumatt Super Market into the basement parking."
5. It is possible the terrorists escaped in part because the Kenyan security forces failed to secure a perimeter. It is rather elementary for the very first thing Western police do in these scenarios is to lock down the perimeter. No one comes in or out unless they can be positively identified as a "friendly". This credentialing occurs by checking IDs and only first admitting law enforcement and first responders to exit upon verification.
6. The mall employed unarmed officers who performed unsatisfactory "wand searches". This is irritating to say the least. Why? Unarmed officers are appropriate for certain environments and are the way to go in most environments. However, in high value targets, such as mass gathering locations in places like Kenya, I would have used an armed component. Armed officers are not only armed but can be equipped with radios and are usually uniformed. This makes identifying them for law enforcement somewhat easier. Also, armed officers can do things unarmed officers can't due to safety concerns such as locking down perimeters and evacuating victims.
7. Wand searches are weak. I dislike them with a passion. Why? Officers get tricked into believing a search was "good" because the wand didn't annunciate. This is all kinds of bad. A search should be thorough in high value targets. If you're going to employ officers and have them search, have them be thorough and do it without a wand. I would use the wand only in environments where I had other search mitigators in place such as backscatters or X-ray search devices.

So what does this attack teach us in the West?

1. The desire of terrorist groups to attack mass gathering locations is still very alive.
2. Places like malls should consider Kenya to be a warning. If you're in mall security, I highly suggest going over your active shooter plan and rehearsing it on a fairly regular basis with local police departments and simulated shooters. In these exercise, test not just your ability to minimize casualties but to also test your security apparatus under stress. This is best accomplished by "killing" responders, taking hostages, attempting escape, and causing confusion among responders. Get your people used to chaos in these scenarios.
3. Never do wand searches at high value targets and test your people regularly. I've gone over why I think wand searches are bad. So let's examine why you should test and train your searchers regularly. Searching is one of the most important yet often neglected security components. We usually pick rookies and the "lowest common denominator" to do this function because it's "easy". Doing good and thorough searches that you can go to sleep easy with at night are not easy. Searchers should be trained on subject "tells", physical characteristics of forbidden items by touch, sound, smell, and sight, the tools they can use to do searches better, etc. They should also be regularly "red-teamed" which is to say you should have a non-attributable person walk through security and see what they can get through. When they're done, they should report to management their findings.
   
   Here's a video I did on how I would search bags:
   
   
4. CCTV and analytics are EXTREMELY important to an active shooter scenario. There are several takeaways from what we learned about CCTV and the lack of analytics in Nairobi. First, CCTV coverage was spotty in some areas. Also, the CCTV coverage was easily identified and avoided by the terrorists. We also know while they had remote viewing capability, it was five miles away and more than likely not cross-fed into the police. While a CCTV monitor can't identify every threat, video analytics can alert them to suspicious activity. At the very least, consider it an option.
5. Garages and parking lots should be regularly patrolled. While there was a guard posted at the entrance of the garage, had a response element been closer by, they could have locked the exterior doors to the mall.
6. Train your employees on how to sound the alarm and IMMEDIATELY lock down their storefronts and secure customers. I would consider including them as a part of your active shooter training as well. Make that mandatory training for all storefront management and their trusted employees. I would include it in a leasing agreement if I had to.
7. Have a HIGHLY accessible public address system to sound the alarm.
8. Train local non-law enforcement responders on the need to "shoot, move, and communicate". Seriously, I can't stress this enough. There is a huge debate in the US surrounding concealed carry permit holders as responders. I'm okay with them responding, though I prefer they receive some training on  the need to identify themselves to law enforcement prior to responding via a phone call if time and circumstance permit.
9. Equip every security person and law enforcement officer with a radio.  If you want to avoid wasting your time clearing rooms that have already been cleared or fratricide, then you HAVE TO equip your responders with radios and share your frequencies with them.
10. Train your personnel on reporting formats like SALUTE. We've covered this before so I won't bore you with the details.
11. Train your security management personnel on casualty collection points, IED mitigation, cordons, perimeter searches, and periodic vulnerability assessments. These things can't be overstated in training. Trust me. You'll thank me for this later.

How CARVER And Site Surveys Can Better Protect Your Assets (and your rear) + [VIDEO]

USAF Security Forces members conducting a site survey (Source: USAF)

"Come on, dude. It's Idaho! No one is ever going to attack us" was a common talking point at my first duty station in the military. It can be difficult when you spend everyday near multi-million dollar aircraft to see their strategic importance particularly when they're located in the "middle of nowhere". Sadly, before 9/11, this attitude was more commonplace than some would care to admit. Nowhere was that more apparent than our original perimeter fence which consisted of two rusted barbed wires, humongous decorative rocks, and almost nonexistent perimeter patrols. On September 11, 2001, the way we and countless other military bases thought of security changed. The base's security posture changed within hours and our "sleepy" installation soon seemed better fitted in Tel Aviv than Idaho. As time went on, that posture too changed. However, a process was adopted to address the dynamic security environment.

One of my jobs in the military was as the Non-Commissioned Officer In-Charge of Physical Security. In short, I managed the physical security program which provided protection for all of the military base's critical weapon systems and their support elements. A key component to that job was conducting various site surveys to evaluate the security already in-place and to make recommendations as to what could be done to enhance it and to address any deviations from accepted security protocols. Basically, I ran around the base thinking of ways I could break and steal things. Over time, I got to be pretty good at seeing what I later called the "security landscape" from my adversary's point-of-view. A good security practitioner does this in a few ways.

• Knowing the threat
• Knowing the importance of the asset
• Talk to subject matter experts regarding the asset
• Knowing the existing defensive measures for the asset
• Knowing what the accepted security practices were for the asset
• Examining the asset and its defensive measures in person
• Testing those measures with exercises using probable attack patterns

This methodology is not new. Site surveys have been around since before Roman times. Supposedly, Caesar would conduct special patrols of his defenses. When he would catch soldiers without their shields or being proactive, they were dealt with severely. Today, many in the public and private sector use what's commonly referred to as the CARVER model which was originally developed as a targeting tool for used by US Special Operations Forces to quickly and thoroughly analyze enemy critical infrastructure to identify a critical node against which a small well-trained force can launch an attack to disable or destroy that infrastructure. CARVER uses a matrix to determine the likelihood of an attack based on several factors:

• Criticality
• Accessibility
• Recuperability
• Vulnerability
• Effect
• Recognizability

Here's a model of that matrix:

I can't stress enough the need to actually see the asset and the area around it in order to make a proper assessment. To do this, you must first go in looking at every conceivable attack venue whether it be cyber or an intrusion. Get a tour and walk around. Next, talk to the experts to determine what's critical to the assets operation. Next, look at similar attacks on similar assets. Then determine how an untrained and a skilled attacker would approach the target. Identify surveillance locations, chokepoints, and avenues of approach. Look for existing defensive measures. Are they adequate? Are they outdated? Finally, sit down and do the most dreaded part of this job - make a report to the decisionmankers. 

In the video below, you'll see a counterintelligence site survey being depicted in the Cold War. It's interesting to see the similarities behind my approach and theirs. Would you do something different?

INFOGRAPHIC: Top 5 Celebrity Break-ins

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Stealing the Spotlight infographic

INFOGRAPHIC: Tips and Facts You Need to Know About Break Ins

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Source: eLocal.com

VIDEO: Top 10 Home/Office Security Camera Considerations

So you're thinking about buying a camera system for your home or office. Great. Buying a camera or an alarm system demands that certain criteria be met before purchase in order for them to meet your security requirements. Many people ask if I like this camera or that camera. I often find myself asking each customer the same things.

1. What exactly are you protecting and is it worth the hassle?
2. How credible is the threat?
3. Where do you want to place the camera?
4. What kind of security will the camera have?
5. What kind of video are trying to capture?
6. Can you monitor it?
7. Have you considered lighting?
8. Have you considered distance to the subject? Height?
9. What are your storage requirements?
10. Will you be turning over what you capture to a third party? If so, does the device you're contemplating have the ability to transfer your video to another device?

As always, if you're stuck and don't know what to do, find a home security system provider in your area. Our partners at homesecurity.inmyarea.com are an AWESOME resource. You can search for providers by zip code to determine who's the best in your area to consider. Well worth a look if you have a moment.

There are a ton of other considerations and things you can ponder on. So I put together the video above explaining my thoughts on what considerations if any you take a look into. As always, feel free to give any feedback particularly if I missed something.

Lessons Learned By a Security Blogger Whose Office Had Been Burglarized

My office at 9:00 AM. I arrived to hear my office had been broken into over Super Bowl weekend.

There is a certain amount of irony one must acknowledge when his own office has been burglarized soon after posting articles talking about burglaries. Some would call it foreshadowing. I'll call it a great streak of luck. What? Yup. Good luck. Why? Mostly because of the lessons I learned. This wasn't my home office. It was the office where I work. Many times we prepare ourselves for the eventuality of being burglarized at home, but seldom do we think of our work. With that, we'll inherently learn lessons about issues we never considered.  So what did I learn?

1. You need an inventory of all the equipment they issued you at work. This inventory will be much like the inventory for your home but this should also encompass day when you were issued the equipment, number of items, serial numbers, and office responsible for accounting for the gear. Go through this list when you look for missing items.
2. Keep an inventory of personal belongings. Let me be clear: "Personal does not mean your lunch bowl". I'm talking about sentimental and expensive items like your iPad, laptop, DVD player, etc. See the lesson from above to consider what to annotate. You may want to keep this list at home or online. 
3. People will undoubtedly start to go crazy. Most people have never been the victim of a crime, so they often experience shock, sadness, and anger about being a victim. It happens and you could feel the same way. When you feel these emotions, remember people rob businesses and government agencies all the time. Sometimes, there is little you can do to prevent it except pay attention to what countermeasures failed you and which things worked. Then get to work and fix what's broken.
4. People will be tempted to play detective. Listen, it's great that you watched all of Perry Mason and Law and Order. However, you probably won't be able to solve this caper. Becoming distracted with how and why you were victimized, keeps you away from fixing what's broke with your security measures. Remember, the best thing you can do is give law enforcement exactly what they need (any video, scene protection, etc.) and think about what went wrong (did someone not lock a door, did someone not set the alarm, is this an inside job).
5. Protect the crime scene. The first thing people want to do when they hear they've been burglarized is find out what was taken. Sounds great. So you let them walk around and look inside drawers, open filing cabinets,turn on computers, etc.. You see no problem with this. Do me a favor - STOP your coworkers from entering the crime scene until law enforcement says they can. It'll impede operations but save the cops a lot of time in processing the scene.
6. Have a procedure in place. We have mechanisms for setting alarms and responding to false calls but no one ever has a procedure for an actual break-in. It's really simple. Write it out. Who needs to be notified? Who needs to know what? When do you need to call? Where should co-workers report for work? What's the impact on operations if the cops need inside? Who should have alarm codes? Who has a master key? What are your lost key procedures? Where are the list of emergency contacts for employees? The list could go infinitely. You get the idea, though. Make it simple, yet comprehensive.
7. Never assume it was anyone's fault other than the burglars? Seriously, don't be stupid and start blaming people for not setting the alarm. People forget things. The alarm code could be one thing. Let it go and work on who should be able to open and close your office. Opening and closing is a big responsibility. Ensure you're entrusting the code to someone who can deal with this added duty. Ensure the people you authorize are the only people allowed 24 hour access. Trust me. You'll thank me later.
8. After the burglary is not the best time to learn your security system sucks. Be intimately familiar with your system and monitoring station protocols. Don't assume anything with a monitoring station. Their procedures for validating the current security status of your facility could be incompatible to your facility. If your monitoring station calls the second floor about the security status of the third floor for which they have no discernible access, then this could very well be counterproductive.
9. If you share an office building with several other tenants, find out what the existing procedures are for lobby security after-hours. You may want to know why they leave the lobby unlocked during the weekend when no one is there. Just saying.
10. Cameras are WORTHLESS if you don't have someone monitoring them. The American population is in the neighborhood of 300 MILLION people give or take. You can catch these guys on tape and get them put in jail if the cops get them. Go ahead - pat yourself on the back. You did a great deed. Ask your security company what it costs to monitor your cameras. Now you have a 24 hour surveillance system that can track and notify authorities of a threat. If not, then you're giving cops video so they can maybe arrest the perpetrator who will more than likely sell what he took. Don't get me wrong - I LOVE cameras. But I HATE when people claim they "feel safer" because of the new cameras they got put in AFTER a burglary. 
11. Your window adjacent the door will get smashed. Remember what I said about concentrating on fixing crappy security measures? Get that fixed.

That's it for now. I would love to hear your war stories about being burglarized. Please post some of the comment section below.

INFOGRAPHIC: 5 of the World's Most Secure Vaults & Bunkers

Top 12 Awesome Way To Beef Up Your Home Security

As a continuation of my home security article previously, I decided to publish a list of tips to upgrade your home security. Have a look and let me know what you think.

Here are my suggestions for beefing up your home security:

1. Get to know your neighbors. Seriously. I know they're annoying and their kids tear up your yard. But they're "natural observers". They'll take greater interests in you and who is at your home. They may also alert you to suspicious activity and call the authorities. There also great for mail pickups when you're not at home.

You laugh but your nosy neighbors could be the best security system you have.

2. Be seen throughout your neighborhood. A person who is active and occasionally walks outside is unpredictable. When terrorists were planning to hit military bases, they chose Ft Dix in New Jersey over Dover Air Force Base. Why? Because Air Force cops don't follow a patrol "pattern". They were literally seen everywhere.

3. If you get a home security system, understand what it's there for. It sounds an alarm and calls the police. The burglar is still inside and may have already planned on that contingency. Does that mean don't get one? No. Get one. Just understand it may not stop a burglar from hitting your home. When you shop for one, understand the technology behind it and understand false alarms do happen and your locality may penalize you for them.

4. Buy a new lock on any newly constructed home. Don't install the lock yourself. Call a reputable locksmith. Next ensure you have a good door. What does that mean? The door should solid if wood and metal if not. There should very little spacing between the lock, the door, and the wall. Ensure you put a good lock on a good door.

5. Don't buy dummy cameras. They're useless and most pros will recognize it as such. Buy a real camera instead if you want one.

Either buy a camera system that works and one you monitor daily or don't get one at all.

6. Fences are bad and good. They can be a useful barrier if they are locked and not easily scaled. That being said, they can prevent natural observers from doing what they do best - observing and being a visual deterrent.

Getting a fence that is too high can be just as bad 
if not worse as getting a fence that is too short.

7. Don't advertise that you have a gun. What that says to a burglar is "I'll wait until I know you're gone and look for your guns to steal". Remember resale is $200.

Signs like this DO NOT keep bad guys away. 

8. Don't buy "no trespassing signs". They never stop a burglar. Ever.

9. If you have a sliding door, get it replaced by actual swinging doors or get a very sturdy lock for them. Ensure the slide is properly mounted to the floor.

This is a VERY sturdy deadbolt lock.

10. Check your windows. How long has your lock been there? Is it crusted over by paint? Is it rusted? Is it flimsy or accessible easily from the outside? If so, it's time for a new lock and a new window.

This lock is keeping NO ONE away. Consider getting a new window if needed.

11. Take expensive product boxes to a recycling center. No ifs and or buts.

Look. Someone got something really nice recently.

12. Don't advertise you're going out of town except to those who NEED to know. By need I mean, it is critical to sustaining your livelihood (they need to pick up mail, approve vacation time for your job, babysit your kid, etc.). The post office can collect your mail if needed. Here's a link - https://holdmail.usps.com/holdmail/

Six Ways Burglars Get Away With Your Stuff

Recently, I was asked to compile a list of way burglars break into homes. The idea behind this list is twofold:

• Demonstrate common burglar/intruder methodology 
• Show the futility in modern home security risk analysis 

Here's what I wrote:

Burglars act as most attackers do. What does that mean? They approach your home the same way any operational threat (bad guy) would whether they are hackers or home invaders. The first thing they do is reconnaissance. This could be as simple as a drive-by or a pretext to get inside of the residence. Some burglars use social media to get an idea as to when you'll be away and/or get an idea as to what kind of loot you have. Not all do. Most common thieves attack venues they know are not secure. Many times it's an inside job (disgruntled employees, relatives, friends of the family, etc.).

This man robbed an East Village Apartment he had been showing
for a real estate company he  was working  for at the time

      

What are they looking for? It depends on their expertise. Most amateurs will stay away from places with an alarm system, if they don't know the code. Professionals are savvy enough to either bypass the alarm or know the code. Stickers and signs can be counter-productive. They advertise to a bad guy you have something worth protecting. They also look for natural observers (nosy neighbors, kids playing at all hours, your activity, your interaction with your neighbors, mailmen, police who regularly patrol the area, and street traffic). They look for flimsy window locks and screen doors. They look for what's accessible from their point of entry. They look for cameras (sometimes - depends on expertise). They look for mail delivery. They also look for large product boxes. These advertise "we just bought a lot of expensive stuff" to prospective thieves. They look for moving boxes. This signals you just moved in and probably won't have an alarm set just yet. They look for proximity to neighbors and relative noise.

They won't all approach your home like this guy.....

Once they have all their particulars in order, they prepare a kit. Some guys already have one for every job. It'll consist of a crowbar or other heavy wedge. They'll have screwdrivers and hammers. They may have lockpicks. They'll have large bags and will likely use a van or other large vehicle. A pro may use a minivan. No one ever suspects a minivan.  

Burglary tools found on an alleged burglar.
You'll notice there are several lockpicks and door wedges.

After they have their kit and transportation, they may decide on a crew. Some guys have one and some don't. They also fit the profile.

Next begins the approach. They'll check doors and see if the door is loose. If there is sufficient spacing, the door has movement. What does that mean? Remember that crowbar? Some guys will also have a master key. When homes are often constructed, the construction company buys standard locks for every house they build in a development. Many times those homes have a key or specialize tool they use to set the lock. This key/tool is like a master key and can open most locks in that development. It's the reason many lock companies have steered away from this. Homeowners should immediately change the locks in any new development. They may also kick the door in. If they do this, the job is really rushed and time is of the essence more so than if they go in quietly. They may look for windows if the doors are not able to be breached. They stick to first floors. Second floor windows can be tricky. You don't have the benefit of leverage and your visibility to those natural observers is greater. If the windows fail, they go for sliding doors. In places like Florida, this is easy. Most people don't engage the slide lock and rely on a bar to keep the door from being pried. If they have time, they can try to wedge the door off the slides. There's also breaking the glass. That's why they look for items that within reach if that becomes an issue.

Sliding doors are a popular point of entry for most burglars

Once inside, the job is easy. They go for ANYTHING. Inside jobs always hit the things you hide or are personal to you. Though nothing is safe. If its in a safe, great. However, if the safe can be easily picked up, they'll just take the safe. They'll look for guns. Guns are an easy $200 in a gun buyback program. They'll also grab the usual stuff - TV's, games, jewelry, etc. Any identity stuff is also HUGE. They'll move this stuff into the vehicle. From there, they'll depart the scene and try to sell your goods.

Inside Chicago School's Extensive Security Measures by ABCNews

As more Newtown shooting victims are laid to rest, we take a look at how one school protects itself.

Honeywell Gets How Duress Switches Should Be Designed

Duress alarms are nothing new.  I recall during the early years of my career setting off a few by accident.  If I do remember anything else, it would be where they were installed.  The vast majority of accidental annunciations were caused by poor placement.  Many were located near an area where you sat like a desk but that sat knee-high on the average person.  Or they were placed were everyday objects were nearby and prone to collision.

So you can imagine how delighted I was when I caught this little gem while perusing another blogger, Colin Bodbyl's site - Zeecure.  In this video he's reviewing the Honeywell 264 Money Clip. This is a duress/hold-up alarm designed for cash-only businesses and activates a silent alarm to a central station or the police when the cash is removed from the clip. Of course, this would need to be installed with an existing alarm system.  But this, as Colin aptly pointed out, you no longer need to have a very conspicuous duress button to be located discretely.  Now, the robber gets the "bait-money" and the alarm is set with very little to be done.  Imagine having help dispatched at the onset of the robbery instead of wasting precious seconds or minutes trying to call or push a duress button while completing the transaction.

An additional problem faced by many security practitioners, with regards to duress alarms, is appearance.  Many duress alarms look like switches with no correlation to where they're placed.  For example, why place a duress switch near a counter-space with no electro-mechanical devices near it?  Why not place it where operator and suspect will have their interaction and it not be seen or look to obvious?  I think designers should remember one key thing about duress switches - ALL BAD GUYS WATCH HEIST MOVIES.  This means they're expecting the duress switch.  Why put employees in danger by having a small metal switch near them?  Why not have something like the Money Clip installed where the interaction is and triggered by the interaction and not the employee?  The awesome thing about the Honeywell 264 Money Clip is it looks like a standard clip found in any cash register or cash drawer. It should be noted Honeywell offers three other types of duress/hold-up alarms to include the 256 Foot Rail, 268 Hold-up Switch, and the 270R Hardwired Hold-up Switch in a plastic case.  A prudent customer would require redundant systems (any of the devices listed previously strategically placed inconspicuously) and (if it's not already included) a duress code (numerical code known to select insiders) added into any alarm control panel as well.  I would prefer one that caused the alarm panel to function normally but send the duress signal to a central station or police dispatcher.  Many systems are designed like this.  However, there are some that are not.  Colin also has some unique uses for it as well.  Check his review out below.

Click on the link below to get product information:

http://www.security.honeywell.com/hsc/products/sensor/ho/21634.html

Click on the link below to find out where to purchase it:

HONEYWELL SENSORS 264 MONEY CLIP HOLD-UP SWITCH

The Power of Sound In Security

 

So, I don't have my hover-board nor my flying car. However, we have seen numerous technological feats within the security industry. Whether it be BRS Labs' use of artificial intelligence to "learn" and detect human behavior via CCTV feeds or the ever-changing world of biometrics, we have witnessed some very interesting and promising tech tools for the industry. Some of them we have featured here at The Security Dialogue.  The other day I came across the Twitter feed for Audio Analytics, a UK-based company which has developed a new dimension to the electronic security world.

Being the curious soul that I am, I contacted Audio Analytics about an interview to learn more about their products.  I spoke with Dr. Christopher Mitchell (PhD), Audio Analytics's CEO and Founder.  Going over his LinkedIn profile and other information I gathered from the Internet, I was drawn to Dr. Mitchell's extensive knowledge of sound information and signal processing.  He's received training at Harvard and a NCGE Fellow.  I digress.

Using audio in security applications is nothing new. Sonitrol was the first and remains the only company using audio as part of its monitoring service. So I asked what was the difference between what we've seen traditionally done with sound in our industry.  Dr. Mitchell replied, "Where Audio Analytic differs is that it does not capture a sound and then trigger an alarm at a monitoring station based on audio level for a human to interpret." Audio Analytic analyses the sound looking for specific sound pattern that can be used to raise an alert into an existing piece of security equipment such as a IP camera or VMS. The sound is looked at as data rather than as a recording or real-time stream of sound.

What surprised me about was the breadth of sound the software can detect.  Dr. Mitchell said it currently looks for sound in four categories - glass breaks, signs of aggression, car alarms, and gun shots. As you can imagine, glass breaks, gun shots, and car alarms didn't trigger as much interest as "aggression".  We've seen glass breaks and gun shot detection in various forms.  In law enforcement, ShotSpotter has become the latest in a growing use of sound analysis technologies.  When asked how they detect for "aggression", Dr. Mitchell stated they look for changes in pitch mostly and sounds attributed to aggressive behavior. Applications where you might see this deployed are lone workers, hospitals, convenience stores, and other places where any sign of aggressive behavior would need to be detected and mitigated as soon as possible.

Speaking of deployments, given the vast array of sounds Audio Analytic could possibly detect with applicable algorithms, it is not surprising to imagine the customers and applications extend far beyond the traditional security realm.  When pressed about this, Dr. Mitchell was quick to inform me they had been contacted by various entities who also recognize its potential and whose specific requests could not be discussed.

Knowing many of our customers are particularly liability conscious, I also inquired as to its implications to privacy. Mr. Mitchell explained the software "analyzes the sound as bits of data".  Therefore, there is not the ability within their software to "hear" the data being analyzed.  That capability would need to be addressed by a secondary piece of software or hardware.

Like all analytics, this is purely software that would need to be integrated with existing hardware designed to capture both sound and video. A company who has already integrated many of Audio Analytics' features is Next Level Security Systems an integrator offering a full suite of security services. NLSS' Gateway Security Platform provides "Audio Analytic with Glass Break Analytic and optional Gunshot, Aggression and Car Alarm packages", among a slew of other features. 

Overall, I am quite impressed with what I see being developed in analytics and Audio Analytic's software is no exception.  I can only imagine its applications and deployments as it continues to develop.  One of the greatest problems we face in security are false alarms.  Audio Analytic has the ability look deeper into the environments we protect and aid us in determining more accurately the difference between the benign and an actual threat.  Dr. Mitchell said it best, "In the security world, we have affection for silent movies".  Perhaps it's time we move on.  As I stated before with BRS Labs, I have seen the future and it's now.

How-To: SIMPLE STEPS TO REINFORCE YOUR DOORS

In my current occupation, it would appear home invasions are "all the rage" among criminals. One of the means in which these crimes are being committed is by kicking in the victim's door. A great step to prevention or providing homeowners with significant response times is reinforcing the doors in which criminals often use.

I highly recommend doing the steps outlined for a few reasons.

1. Standard home doors and their locks come equipped with 1" screws which provide little resistance against brute force entry.
2. You can buy the most sophisticated door with the most expensive lock but it's worth nothing if it gets kicked in by a crazy method addict who wants your television or worse to get their "fix".

One of the sites I go to for various disaster preparedness ideas, The Homestead Survival, featured two videos on how to reinforce your doors. Their link and the videos are below:

The Homestead Survival: How To Secure and Reinforce A Door Videos

Pwned: Russian Rocket-maker Guards Caught Sleeping on the Job

Guard management is perhaps the most important entity in any security infrastructure.  If your on-site security personnel are led properly, they are more vigilant and duty-focused.  However, should your guard supervisors fail to properly lead and conduct regular checks on their personnel, inevitably you will find out just how important knowing the difference between leadership and supervision is.

In Russia, Energomash, the rocket manufacturer of the Soyuz capsules, learned this lesson when fellow bloggers  Lana Sator entered their manufacturing plant while guards were sleeping on duty.  As a former supervisor of security personnel, I can attest there is nothing like having a facility penetrated because your responders were asleep.  To make matters worse, Lana and several of her friends made five visits and each time the guards were asleep.  They gained access to several critical manufacturing sections and posted their exploits online.  As you can imagine, Russian defense and space bureaucrats were not happy and are looking at steep punishments for guards and I'm sure, managers.

Here are some pictures from Lana's blog:

The Russians aren't alone.  In 2009, guards from one of the largest guard companies in the world, Wackenhut, were caught dozing off at a nuclear facility.  Check out the video below:

MUST SEE TV: Off the Grid

I, normally try my best not to get overly excited about new television shows especially new security-related shows.  Either they're too good and "jump the shark" by doing something completely unrealistic or actually very real life.  However, when I first glimpsed at an article about a show called Off The Grid, I was having difficulty controlling the copious amounts of drool pooling around my feet.  What's the show about you ask?  According to Security Info,  the premise behind it is "that the two contestants win a million dollars if they can remain hidden from the surveillance experts for a single day, while completing a few essential tasks in downtown Los Angeles".  Not drool-worthy - I know.  People hide in a city and are pursued by non-threatening "experts".  Not real exciting because we've seen this done before - HORRIBLY.  However, here's why the salivation began:

Armed with only very basic information about the two contestants, a team of surveillance experts led by human tracking expert Kevin Reeve, is tasked with learning enough about the contestants to find where they might be and then to go out and actually bring them in. At Kevin's disposal are Rob (an experienced hacker) and Matt (a proven corporate security IT specialist). These guys can infiltrate your cell phone, gain access to public records information and generally put the digital eye on you. Also on the team is Dave, a former Navy SEAL who works a day job training SEAL teams in California. They're exactly the four guys you wouldn't want tracking you in an urban environment.

And the drool accumulates right about here:

As for the security industry, you'll recognize a number of technologies used in the surveillance. There are cameras from Axis Communications and FLIR, UAVs used for video surveillance, facial recognition technology, Ostendo surveillance monitors, ASK.com mapping technology, advanced mobile communications from Skype, Pelican's tough "go cases", a mobile command unit, and high-end server technology for integrating all the tracking and personnel information that the pursuit team generates.

"We're selling that this is real technology used by the DoD world," said Ebersol. "It is incredibly important for us to be authentic; it's not the Jack Bauer version of technology."

When does it start?  December 7, 2011 at 11pm ET.  Crappy time slot.  Oh well.

Here's a trailer:

 

FREE Training: Ever wanted to learn how to be a locksmith?

Who like FREE training?  I know I do.  So every time I find FREE training, you better believe I'm going and I'm posting it for all eyes on this site.  The Society of Professional Locksmiths is offering FREE locksmith training for beginners.

Who are they? And what's this FREE training all about? According to their site,

"It is a professional organization that embraces all levels of skill and expertise. Through education and support, the Society provides its members the skills needed to succeed.

That FREE training I mentioned earlier is called the "Locksmith Training Program" which "consists of 12 chapters of "core knowledge" all locksmiths are expected to learn and considered to be manadtory."

To find out more click here.

Top 10 MORE Questions To Ask Your Prospective Alarm Company

Not too long ago, fresh out the military, I was an alarm system salesman.  It was a wonderful learning experience that taught me many things.  One of those lessons was "All security companies are not created equal."  People assume, like they do with all major purchases, the most popular or cheaper brand is in fact the better brand.  The majority of the time they learn this is not case.  So, I decided to post some questions for prospective customers to ask when they begin their search for a security company.  (Please note this doesn't just apply to alarm systems.  You can apply these questions to camera systems, access control, locks, etc.)

1. What areas will this alarm system not cover?  There is an implied belief among some customers that an alarm system protects their entire property.  Have you ever considered what would happen if someone broke into your neighbor's store and punched a hole in the drywall you share?  Do you have a sensor that will pick up the noise or vibration?  Chances are you don't.  The problem with modern security systems is they advertise exactly where you have coverage and where you don't.  Don't believe me?  Walk into a small storefront and notice how many infrared sensors you set off.
2. What's your apprehension rate in my area?  This is particularly important if you're in an area where burglaries happen a lot.  If someone breaks into nearby businesses who use the popular name brand security service without getting caught, should you be buying from them?
3. What's your response time to service issues?  What happens if some drunk rams his car into a nearby power pole and kills your alarm system?  Does your system have battery backup until service is restored?  If not, how soon can your company arrive to remedy the issue?
4. How much do you charge per service calls?  Some companies make a living by selling a crappy installation and billing you every time it breaks and they have to come out and fix it.  You want a company with a good reputation for service and who makes house calls on the cheap.
5. Can I cancel at anytime?  One of my first sales lead I had was a lady who was opening up a small Internet cafe.  She knew she had a need for the system but was concerned about our price and contract obligation.  The economy was rough and she, like many small business owners, didn't know if she would be in business for 5 days let alone 5 years.  Pick a company who is sympathetic to that.
6. Are you developing original product lines or selling me something made by the lowest bidder?  I can't tell you how many companies I see selling all sorts of "new groundbreaking technologies" that were developed by a previous competitor just marketed differently.  If they'll lie about the product's origins, they'll lie about anything.
7. Can I manage my account all in one place online?  Some of you aren't real tech savvy nor like to handle business online.  I totally understand that and encourage you to do what's comfortable for you.  However, if you like doing everything online as much as possible, inquire if they offer online account management.  If you're responsible for a large system and want to track multiple alarms or trouble alerts, it would be extremely helpful to have this capability.
8. What kind of redundancy do you have for your alarm centers?  Do they transfer alarm monitoring to another facility if the original is affected by natural disaster?  Wouldn't it be a shame if where your building is at there are sunny skies, but the alarm center which is another state several thousand miles away was hit by a blizzard with no power for weeks?  What happens to your alarms?
9. How much familiarization do your sales personnel get with the product?  Wouldn't you hate being sold a car the car dealer never drove?  How can someone tell you about the quality of their installation and service components if they've never seen them in action?  I would be highly impressed by any company who had new sales personnel going out on these calls with their experienced technicians.
10. What separates you from everyone else?  Most salesmen will attempt to answer this but usually fail.  Why?  Because they're focused on what their company told them makes them different.  If he or she gives you an honest answer such as "We charge a higher price", he's good to go because he'll follow up with "You get what you pay for in life.  If you want a free root canal, I could give it to you but you won't sleep easy.  We charge more because we're worth more.  We provide better service, a better product that we developed, and a commitment to protecting your business rain or shine.  It took you a while to build this business.  We want to ensure you have a while to enjoy it."

Captain, we are being hailed....

It isn't every day you get to look at the future.  One day in October, I did just that.  It all started with a Tweet during ASIS 2011 regarding behavioral analytics.  I was somewhat curious as to what it was and so I chimed in asking questions.  Normally, when you start asking questions about a product, you don't expect the company to "follow" you on Twitter.  Well, BRS Labs did just that.

Curious as to what behavioral analytics was and why BRS Labs thought it would revolutionize the security industry, I requested an interview.  Boy, am I glad I did because they didn't put me in contact with a PR minion.  Nope.  I spoke with the CEO and founder, Ray Davis, a pioneer in the tech sector.  According to the company's website, "In 2000, when the Dot.coms of the era struggled to deliver a cost-effective operating system for the Internet, Mr. Davis invented the only viable method to deliver computer applications online. With the technology built and patented, Simdesk Technologies delivered Office applications over the Internet at a staggering 20 million users per server, a benchmark that has never been matched."

Good afternoon, Mr. Davis.  It is an honor to speak with you.  I have some very general questions to ask about BRS and behavioral analytics.  Would you please tell us what behavioral analytics is?


Thanks, Scriven.  Let's first start off by explaining how this all came about.  Over the years, the security industry has developed and marketed what we term as "rules-based analytics".  What that entails is programming a CCTV system to alert an operator of a violation of a prescribed set of "rules" in its view.  It operates like a traditional "trip wire".  If the camera detects a pattern inconsistent with the users prescribed set of allowed patterns, it alerts the operator.  The industry went to this model because it realized the unrealistic expectation that an operator could stare at numerous screens for hours on end and reliably analyze various data streams.

There are problems with this, though.  Installation costs in regards to "man hours" are high.  It can take hours or days to setup each camera with each set of "rules".  Additionally, they are also high maintenance costs as well.  If the camera moves, then you have to change the rules all over again.  Perhaps the biggest drawback is in "real world" situations it can cause missed or false alarms.  In other words, you can have a false alarm generated by a normal nonthreatening event.  This is an issue because as the event occurs over and over again the amount of false alarms increase and eventually the operator could begin to ignore any alarm from that camera thinking any alarm could be a false one.

Obviously, the industry needed a better solution.  So at BRS Labs, we began to look for ways to make the system smarter and more adaptable to change.  The only way to make the system smarter was artificial intelligence.  (ATTENTION READERS:  This is where it gets COOL!!)  We created what is called an "artificial neural network" which could understand the "behavior" of an object and create the video into a computer language.  It generates "memories" over a period of time.  Rules-based systems are never as good as the first day.  With behavioral analytics, it is dramatically different because the system is always learning and adapting.

Me (a HUGE Star Trek fan attempting to control my drool):  Did you just say "artificial neural network"?  You just made this Trekkie's day.


As we developed this product, I often teased my children I was working to help create the "Big Brother" computer in the movies.

What are some of the pros and cons of doing this sort of tech in the security industry?


For starters, video analytics takes any where from 5 hours to 40 days to install per camera.  It takes behavioral analytics two weeks to learn.  After that, it never has to learn a new set of "rules" or patterns.  It literally studies the behavior of the objects in view and determines what is abnormal and what is not.  Traditional analytics generates approximately 1,500 false alarms whereas our system generates 1 alert on average per day.  After 30 to 60 days, it gets to less than one per day.  You can move a camera and not have to change to a different set of rules.  It will actively learn and adapt to its new "environment" or view.

What are some of the challenges you faced when developing this system?


First, you have to understand nothing like this had ever been attempted.  The challenges were massive.  Since no one had ever undertaken something like this, we had to start from "scratch".    Once we converted video into a programming language, the biggest challenge was developing a quality control for the product.  It had to be tested and the "kinks" worked out before its launch.  Because we are a software driven organization we took this approach.

Who have been some of its earliest adopters and what is the future of this technology?


One of our earliest customers was a major hotel in Bali who needed a system that could detect abnormal behavior.  This is significant because we were approached after the terrorist attacks there.  The customer was expecting to detect terrorists.  They got more than that.  Our system because it's constantly learning what is normal and what is not can detect any abnormal behavior.  In Bali, it was looking at an entrance and detected a security deficiency.  It saw several people bypassing a security checkpoint without being challenged or detected by the security personnel.

Given its ability to detect such abnormalities, we have been approached by Defense agencies to develop a way for our product to exist within unmanned aerial vehicles.

Me (having more difficulty controlling drool):  Did you just say "unmanned aerial vehicles"?


The system can look at video of regardless where its taken and "learn" if anything in it view has changed and alert operators on the ground.  The applications are boundless.

Me:  Mr. Davis, thanks so much for taking the time to talk with me.  This is perhaps the coolest thing I've heard affecting our industry possibly in the last 10 years.


Here's a video of the system in action:


http://www.brslabs.com/includes/examples/PublicAccessPTZPosition4.html