OPINION: The Color of Legit

Be forewarned – this involves critical thinking:

The death of a childhood friend and subsequent similar homicides at the hands of criminals with guns in our inner cities has brought me a great amount of reflective pause about how we visualize the legitimacy of homicide victims. Seemingly, there is a great abundance of news headlines featuring homicides that have become all-too-familiar. The victims are usually young, African-American, and live in some of our most populated cities – places which used to be known for significant wealth and prosperity but now are a reflection of something much darker. Their assailants are also described as young, African-American, and from the inner-city. If we’re being specific, there’s also the added description of the homicide which usually “tells us all we need” – the murder was “gang-related”. Many times, our initial summation and often ill-informed analysis hinges on these circumstances. That “analysis” takes just under a few seconds but the power it conveys lasts a lifetime.

What’s most striking is in this internal discourse of legitimacy is not that we’re wrestling with the notion of whether the crime happened but whether the victims “deserved” to be killed and if so, whether a crime even occurred. Come on, admit it. How many times have you heard of a 16 year old kid in Chicago being murdered and saw the words “gang-related” in the article somewhere and thought “Figures”? Oh, you haven’t heard of those kinds of homicides before? No worries, we’ll cover that later.

This perception just doesn’t end with race. “Legit” victims have political parties, live in certain neighborhoods, and subscribe to our favorite religions. I’ll make a small wager – I could post the names of Chicago’s shooting deaths and won’t get near as many “retweets”, “favorites”, “shares”, or “likes” as I do when I post about cop deaths or guys in the military. Don’t get me wrong – I served in both capacities and those deaths were honorable and deserved being mentioned. That being said, what does it say about the value we place on human lives, when we feel certain deaths are worth more of our attention than others. Those officers died on those streets to stop crimes like those murders from happening, yet we’re astoundingly silent when it comes to remembering those dead. Why is that? Is there some part of us that can’t or won’t acknowledge a certain dark truth which is not “all lives matter”?

I was on the podcast, CovertContact not too long ago and somewhere in my rant there, you’ll probably notice I was very emphatic about something I feel will be a pressing national security issue soon. If we don’t embody what we preach which is “all lives do matter” in every fiber of our national fabric, then those who continue to feel devalued will act as those they and those who look just like them have no value. 

Sadly, the crisis we have growing exponentially doesn’t require me to furnish any statistics to make this point – the truth is all too apparent. That simple but very present reality is that unless victims match our skin color, go to our churches, believe in exactly the same things we do, and are willing to admit our supremacy on matters where we disagree, their lives are as meaningless as those “retweets”, “favorites”, “likes”, and “shares” I mentioned before. This is not a crisis we should crave or even begin to think we’re adequately prepared for. Care not because their lives matter but care because all lives truly do matter.

RIP Danny Williams, 29 years old, college graduate, Christian, father, son, brother, cousin, and loyal friend.

OPINION: The Impact of Bias & Politics In Security

Originally, I wanted to make this an “open letter” to my fellow Americans about the current state of security. I was going to lecture us for engaging in pointless arguments and conjecture regarding where to place the blame for our security failings and who deserved credit for our success. However, this will not be an “open letter”, though; I will address these issues in this post. That’s right. I’m probably going to offend a few of you. Stick around because you’ll soon discover I’ll offend someone you don’t like. So let’s begin.

There seems to be an incessant desire to inject our personal political beliefs into how we view security. This used to occur only in the domain of national security. Here it was more acceptable, expected, and understandable than in others. In 2014, we saw a dramatic shift in this paradigm. The injection of politics has occurred throughout the spectra of security. Hacks on corporations have occurred in the name of political differences and responsibility assigned (accurately or inaccurately) based on them as well. Even areas thought immune to politics such as personnel security saw this as well. Discourse diluted to regurgitation of talking points. Experts emerged with little to any relative experience or extensive security knowledge but gained popularity because of which side they seemed to agree with. Accusations were cast as fact with little to corroborate them other than innuendo and insinuation from less-than-objective sources.

Today, the discussions of security have become little more than massive pep rallies and virtual lynch mobs. As professionals and practitioners, we rely on credible and objective evidence-based analysis to make informed decisions for our clients. Yet, the current discourse has been infected with vitriol and far-from-honest portrayals. In order to correct our course, we must examine what is occurring and how we can change.

1. What happened to having conversations? This is a question I find myself posing quite a bit on social media these days. The dialogues people are having with one another about things in security have been destructive, short on content, and full of conjecture. Twitter is the perfect place to watch this devolution. People shout and angrily dismiss opinions they don’t agree with, in an effort to assert expertise rather than collaborative learning. I don’t pretend to have all of the answers and so I use Twitter and other mediums as a means of learning more. Yet, so many people don’t want to learn. They’d rather spend their time proving you wrong rather than hearing your perspective. In certain cases, I get this. Some ideas are flatly wrong or just an attempt to “troll”. Therein lays our greatest weapon in bringing back sound intellectual discourse – choice. We can always choose to ignore opinions that are not in the interests of learning and sharing knowledge. Yet, we don’t but we need to.
2. We seem to like to state our bias but pretend as though it doesn’t matter. Facts are facts but our bias has a great deal of influence on our analysis of those facts. The worse offense we make is allowing our bias to form our opinions. On social media, I have seen a great many of profiles with biographies full of stated or implied bias. Not surprisingly, I find many of these accounts and their timelines to be absent of manipulated or inaccurate facts and vitriolic opinions. When challenged, these accounts retort how much they don’t care that influences them, how the “other side” does it too, and how the challenger’s facts are wrong or formed from the “mainstream media”. Miraculously, these accounts don’t see how this very analysis is influenced by theirs.We all have a bias. We can’t escape it nor should we. That being said, it is incumbent upon us to realize our bias and understand how it influences our analysis and our subsequent opinions. For example, if you don’t know anyone who owns a firearm and never touched a gun before but hold very anti-gun opinions after a friend was shot, it may be prudent to understand how your lack of exposure and the tragic event of losing a friend could have an impact on your opinions about guns. This doesn’t mean you’re wrong but it certainly pays dividends to understand.
3. The labels we give people have a tremendous impact on the level of discourse and engagement we seek to have. Come on. Let’s not pretend we don’t know what RWNJ (right wing nutjob), Libtard, Democraps, SJW (social justice warrior), gun nut, thug, un-patriotic, Obummer, and others mean. These are the “nice” labels. Have you ever had someone call you “stupid” after you articulate a point and thought you were going to be taken seriously? Have you ever called someone “stupid” after they made their initial point and expected them to take your argument seriously? No. That’s not how constructive discourse works. We use these labels in order to dismiss people’s arguments because we either fear taking them seriously or we don’t want to listen to them. In some cases, I get this. I do. I get trolled at times and I find it easy (though I resist) to troll back.
   
   If we’re truly interested in having meaningful discussions and want people to take us and our ideas seriously, perhaps we should drop the labels. Our forefathers often engaged in heated debates with another about various topics. However, they recognized their greatest vulnerability rested in their greatest weapon – their ability to compromise. Consensus and commitment can’t occur when you’re busy tearing people (instead of their bad arguments) down. By tearing down our neighbors, our enemies find new allies to defeat us. If there is one lesson we’ve learned this year, it’s that the insider can have the greatest impact.
4. Stop using tragedy to assert your political commentary. There are few things that rub me wrong than this. I have been on Twitter for little over three years and in that time; I have witnessed countless tragedies as they were happening. With each crisis, there are new experts vying for their voice to be heard among the ever-growing field. During the initial days of the Ferguson riots, I was called upon to give my opinions. It was an experience I will never forget and it gave me valuable insight into how politics with its own agenda shapes much of the dialogue in security. Good or bad, there are a host of issues which impact security and law enforcement which wouldn’t drive as much discussion if it were not for politics.
   That being said, I find a great many of “experts” use social media and the settings of tragic events as platforms to inject their personal political allegiance and ambitions in to their “objective” analysis of security issues. Nowhere has this been more apparent and to our detriment than in the recent spate of officer-involved-shootings. There are a host of instances where “experts” have used incomplete, manufactured, outdated, or demonstrative data from corollary events in an effort to support their biased and politically-based opinions. Nowhere but in our current media paradigm do we see and accept this so blindly.
5. In a world where events don’t matter unless they “go viral” or cause our clients embarrassment, it is strange how we ignore the impact this has on both how information is given and received and why. Even stranger is how we ignore how that happens. Today, you can’t visit a news story and not see a button to like or share the content with others. News organizations no longer make their money off of consumers but advertisers. Ads are custom-delivered to us based on our reactions to various news articles. Many times, we don’t see a story unless it’s “trending”. So if we’re only seeing things based on our reactions to them and it’s solely crafted in its current form to create an emotional response, then why ignore the influence this has on our discussions about these stories?

Perhaps, when we care more about how we receive and present information, we’ll make more informed decisions regarding the issues surrounding our industry. We may even see a high-return in a public that takes us more seriously and understands the mental acuity required to understand the threat, our risks, and vulnerabilities. When we get back to having meaningful and constructive discourse founded on information meant to inform and not persuade, we’ll do more than prattle about who should be our political party of choice.

Ten OPSEC Lessons Learned From The Good Guys, Bad Guys, and People-in-Between

If you've been in the security world long enough, you've heard of a term called "OPSEC" or operational security. This is a security discipline in which organizations or individual operators conduct their business in a manner that does not jeopardize their true mission. If you're a police officer who is staking out a house, it would be bad OPSEC to sit outside the house in a marked police vehicle. I think it's prudent we discuss this discipline so we can better analyze our own processes by which we protect ourselves and our operations. Reviewing the OPSEC process is a great place to start. The following come from Wikipedia (I know - it's super-scholarly):

1. Identification of Critical Information: Identifying information needed by an adversary, which focuses the remainder of the OPSEC process on protecting vital information, rather than attempting to protect all classified or sensitive unclassified information.
2. Analysis of Threats: the research and analysis of intelligence, counterintelligence, and open source information to identify likely adversaries to a planned operation.
3. Analysis of Vulnerabilities: examining each aspect of the planned operation to identify OPSEC indicators that could reveal critical information and then comparing those indicators with the adversary’s intelligence collection capabilities identified in the previous action.
4. Assessment of Risk: First, planners analyze the vulnerabilities identified in the previous action and identify possible OPSEC measures for each vulnerability. Second, specific OPSEC measures are selected for execution based upon a risk assessment done by the commander and staff.
5. Application of Appropriate OPSEC Measures: The command implements the OPSEC measures selected in the assessment of risk action or, in the case of planned future operations and activities, includes the measures in specific OPSEC plans.
6. Assessment of Insider Knowledge: Assessing and ensuring employees, contractors, and key personnel having access to critical or sensitive information practice and maintain proper OPSEC measures by organizational security elements; whether by open assessment or covert assessment in order to evaluate the information being processed and/or handled on all levels of operatability (employees/mid-level/senior management) and prevent unintended/intentional disclosure.

We should also recognize good guys aren't the only ones who practice this discipline. As a matter of fact, the bad guys do as well and many are quite good at it. The lessons we could learn from them, our fellow security professionals, and others are almost immeasurable.

1. NEVER trust a big butt and a smile. Yup. I started off with that. Bear with me. Many intelligence agencies and law enforcement organizations use sex as a means to get close to a target or person of interest. Most bad guys realize this. However, many do not to their own detriment. When involved with people in a relationship or sexual encounter, they get very close to you and your secrets. I liken these people to "trusted agents" who you allow close enough to you that can get more information than you're willing or able to share publicly. Poor OPSEC practitioners often forget this. Most of their security failures stem from this fatal flaw. I'm not saying to not be in a relationship or to eschew intimacy. If you're in a job that requires you adhere to sound OPSEC principles, what I'm advising you to do is to exercise due diligence and conduct a risk analysis before you do. Think Marion Barry, Anthony Weiner, and Elliott Spitzer.



Immortal words spoken during an EPIC fail.

2. Always have a thoroughly vetted back-story for your cover. This is commonly referred to as "legend" in the intelligence community. This is an identity in line with your established, synthetic cover. For example, I previously mentioned the hacker known as the The Jester in a previous blog post. Depending on which side you're on, he's either a bad guy or a good guy. However, the lessons he teaches us about cover are insightful. Whenever someone "doxes" him, he has a prepared and detailed analysis as to how he created that cover identity. Many times he'll use a name that does exist with a person who either does not exist or who he has cleverly manufactured using a multitude of identity generators. He'll use disposable credit cards, email, LinkedIn profiles, VPNs which show logins from his cover location, etc. He even engages in cyber-deception with other actors to establish various cover stories for operations that require them. Whether you like him or not, he's certainly good at one thing we know for sure - cover discipline.
3. NEVER trust anyone you just met. I see you laughing. Many people mistakenly believe they can and should trust everyone they meet. They will often claim they don't but their behavior says otherwise. As Ronald Reagan is often quoted is saying, "In God we trust, all others we verify" I firmly believe this to be the most crucial aspect of operational security. Proper trust is needed in any environment for the mission to be accomplished. However, blind trust can and will kill any hopes of a successful mission. Whether you're checking identification at an entry control point or planning cybersecurity for an online bank, you should always treat every introduction you don't initiate as suspect. Then triage people and their level of access according to risk acceptance. This is a lesson we learned with Edward Snowden. He'd only been at Booze Hamilton a few months before he began siphoning massive amounts of classified information he had no direct access or need-to-know. Another saying I'm fond of is "Keep your enemies close, but your friends closer." I'm not saying everyone you meet is going to steal from you or betray your trust. Like my momma always says, "Not everyone that smiles at you is your friend and not every frown comes from an enemy."
4. Shut the hell up! No. Seriously. Shut up. If you hang around the special operations community, you'll hear a term used to describe the work they do as "quiet professionals". Most successful bad guys realize the best way to ensure longevity to shut the hell up. Bragging about or giving "pre-game commentary" before an operation are guaranteed ways to get caught or killed. The truly dangerous people are the one's who never say a word and just do their work. Sometimes, lethality is best expressed with silence.
   
   
   
   
   
5. Watch what you leak. While we can keep our mouths shut, it is more difficult in the information age to keep everything connected to us quiet. In order to properly protect ourselves, we have to begin this process by conducting proper risk analysis. Is what I'm doing right now giving away something I don't want the public to know? Is the the device or medium I'm talking on able to give away information I'm not comfortable with sharing? Does my enemy have the ability to intercept or analyze what I'm doing in order to gain sensitive information? What "tells" am I projecting? These are a few of many questions you should be asking in order to ensure you're limiting "noise litter".
   
   

   

   In the information age, do I need to say more?

6. If you're doing secret stuff, NEVER EVER EVER EVER EVER, talk on the wire. Look at the Mafia as a perfect example of what not to do. As an OPSEC practitioner, you should never communicate on any medium that can give away your secrets or be intercepted. John Gotti got busted talking on the wire. A person rule of thumb: If it can receive messages, it can transmit messages without you knowing. Treat every computer like an informant - feed it what you're willing to share with your adversary.
7. NEVER ever touch or be in the same place as the "product". For the uninitiated, that is one of first rules of the dope game. Every successfully, elusive drug dealer knows to keep away from the "product" (read "drugs). Whatever the "product" in your "game", ensure you put enough distance between you and it. If you have to be close to it, then have a good reason to be with it.
8. Recognize "the lion in the tall grass". When practicing OPSEC, if there is one thing you should never forget is why you're doing it. The reason you're practicing it is simple - there are people out there that oppose you. Ignore them at your detriment.
9. NEVER say something you can't backup or prove immediately. Nothing says you're a person needing to be checked out better than saying things you can backup or prove. People who are trying to vet you will require you backup what you say for a reason. Be ready for this. A great example of this is demonstrated by people who claim to be connected to someone of stature in order to gain access. In this case, they're found out because the target asked the other party who could not confirm this.
10. Treat your real intentions and identity as that gold ring from Lord of the Rings. I'm not saying put your driver's license on a necklace so a troll who think it's his "precious" won't take it. First of all, that's too cool to happen in real life. Second, you'll look like an idiot. Finally, there are more practical ways of protecting your identity. For starters, never have anything that connects your identity to your operation. Next, if you have to use your real identity in connection with an operation, give yourself some ability to deny the connection. Lastly, NEVER trust your identity, intentions, or operations to anyone or anything other than yourself.

I've decided to include the more practical list from the "Notorious B.I.G." to drive home some of these principles:

TEN CRACK COMMANDMENTS

1. Rule number uno, never let no one know
   How much, dough you hold, 'cause you know
   The cheddar breed jealousy 'specially
   If that man *** up, get your *** stuck up
2. Number two, never let 'em know your next move
   Don't you know Bad Boys move in silence or violence
   Take it from your highness
   I done squeezed mad clips at these cats for they bricks and chips
3. Number three, never trust nobody
   Your moms'll set that *** up, properly gassed up
   Hoodie to mask up, s***, for that fast buck
   She be layin' in the bushes to light that *** up
4. Number four, know you heard this before
   Never get high on your own supply
5. Number five, never sell no *** where you rest at
   I don't care if they want a ounce, tell 'em bounce
6. Number six, that God*** credit, dig it
   You think a *** head payin' you back, *** forget it
7. Seven, this rule is so underrated
   Keep your family and business completely separated
   Money and blood don't mix like two *** and no ***
   Find yourself in serious s***
8. Number eight, never keep no weight on you
   Them cats that squeeze your *** can hold jobs too
9. Number nine, shoulda been number one to me
   If you ain't gettin' bags stay the f*** from police
   If niggaz think you snitchin' ain't tryin' listen
   They be sittin' in your kitchen, waitin' to start hittin'
10. Number ten, a strong word called consignment
    Strictly for live men, not for freshmen
    If you ain't got the clientele say hell no
    'Cause they gon' want they money rain, sleet, hail, snow

Don't forget the admonition from Notorious B.IG. gives that should never be diminished:

Follow these rules, you'll have mad bread to break up
If not, twenty-four years, on the wake up
Slug hit your temple, watch your frame shake up
Caretaker did your makeup, when you pass

An information security professional known as "The Grugq" gave a very interesting talk on OPSEC, I think it is worth taking a glance at (try to contain all laughter and bafoonery at the preview image - we're running a family show here, folks):

Terrorism and Intelligence Legislation You Should Know About But Don't

Now that this NSA story has spawned the insane amount of nonsensical and baseless conjecture on my Twitter feed, I thought I'd take a moment and educate everyone on intelligence and terrorism legislation they should already know about but don't for various reasons.

Terrorism:

• Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989
• Executive Order 12947 signed by President Bill Clinton Jan. 23, 1995, Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten To Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, and later expanded to include freezing the assets of Osama bin Laden and others.
• Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995
• US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (see also the LaGrand case which opposed in 1999-2001 Germany to the US in the International Court of Justice concerning a German citizen convicted of armed robbery and murder, and sentenced to death)
• Executive Order 13224, signed by President George W. Bush Sept. 23, 2001, among other things, authorizes the seizure of assets of organizations or individuals designated by the Secretary of the Treasury to assist, sponsor, or provide material or financial support or who are otherwise associated with terrorists. 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
• 2001 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools for Intercepting and Obstructing Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act)(amended March 2006) (the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act was integrated to it) - I don't have enough energy to discuss the Patriot Act. All you need to know is that it gives the US government very broad powers in order to combat terrorism.
• Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296.
• Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act (SAFETY Act) of 2002
• REAL ID Act of 2005 - Perhaps one of the most controversial pieces of legislation from the Bush era, it set forth certain requirements for state driver's licenses and ID cards to be accepted by the federal government for "official purposes", as defined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. It also outlines the following: 
• Title II of the act establishes new federal standards for state-issued driver licenses and non-driver identification cards.
• Changing visa limits for temporary workers, nurses, and Australian citizens.
• Funding some reports and pilot projects related to border security.
• Introducing rules covering "delivery bonds" (similar to bail bonds but for aliens who have been released pending hearings).
• Updating and tightening the laws on application for asylum and deportation of aliens for terrorist activity.
• Waiving laws that interfere with construction of physical barriers at the borders
• Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006 - The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) prohibits any person from engaging in certain conduct "for the purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise." and extends to any act that either "damages or causes the loss of any real or personal property" or "places a person in reasonable fear" of injury. 
• Military Commissions Act of 2006 - The United States Military Commissions Act of 2006, also known as HR-6166, was an Act of Congress signed by President George W. Bush on October 17, 2006. The Act's stated purpose was "To authorize trial by military commission for violations of the law of war, and for other purposes." It was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2008 but parts remain in order to use commissions to prosecute war crimes.
• National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 - The second most controversial piece of legislation from the War on Terror authorizes "the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition under the law of war.
  (b) Covered Persons- A covered person under this section is any person as follows:
  (1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.
  (2) A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.
  (c) Disposition Under Law of War- The disposition of a person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) may include the following:
  (1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
  (2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code (as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (title XVIII of Public Law 111-84)).
  (3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent tribunal having lawful jurisdiction.
  (4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s country of origin, any other foreign country, or any other foreign entity.
  (d) Construction- Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.
  (e) Authorities- Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States.
  (f) Requirement for Briefings of Congress- The Secretary of Defense shall regularly brief Congress regarding the application of the authority described in this section, including the organizations, entities, and individuals considered to be ‘covered persons’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2).
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 requires all federal and state agencies establish response protocols for critical domestic incidents in line with the National Incident Management System.

Intelligence

• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is perhaps the most interesting and secretive of laws we have. It was enacted to combat the threat of foreign intelligence services through surveillance activities abroad and at home. It allows these broad surveillance powers to be used against foreign and domestic agents. In other words, it authorizes our government to spy on its citizens if it believes they present a credible national security threat. FISA warrants are granted by secret courts that exist solely for approving FISA warrants. Note: I said "approving" as in for every warrant the DoJ has ever applied for, they have gotten it. Nowhere else in our judicial system do such powers exist.
• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 enacted several of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. It established the the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
• 18 USC § 798 - Disclosure of classified information - Criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
• 50 USC § 421 - Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources - Think Valerie Plame.

INFOGRAPHIC: A Day In The Life Of DHS

I often dish out a lot of criticism towards he Department of Homeland Security. However, it is not without understanding the sheer vastness of what their work undertakes. I often peruse their site (and so should you) to gain insight into what they face. This site has always been a great information source and has been very responsive towards citizen queries. Though, I'm sure some would disagree. After you take a look, I highly recommend giving their site a look.

Department of Homeland Security Site:

http://www.dhs.gov

INFOGRAPHIC: Syria's S-300s

You may heard by now of the S-300 missiles Russia has pledged to sell to the Syrian regime. There has been a great deal of speculation from the White House and other interested entities as to whether this could prolong or even send the crisis in an even greater spiral. In an effort to provide you with the facts about the S-300, I included this pretty cool infographic from a Twitter user who has demonstrated a wealth of knowledge when it comes to missiles and all things that go "boom":

Infographic: #Syria's S-300s: A fact sheet. twitter.com/iainoverton/st… via @iainoverton #missile #Assad #OSINT
— Kalashnikitty (@CustosDivini) May 31, 2013

Water Wars - It Has Nothing To Do With Kevin Costner

While most of the developing world has focused on oil being the resource that fuels most global conflicts, many groups have voiced concern we're missing a very important resource that is rapidly depleting - water. That's right, folks. The resource we all need to sustain our lives is going away very quickly in some places where conflicts are already occurring due to resource depletion and lack of supply to meet demand. There are LOADS of reasons why this is and I don't want to fill this space with conjecture and debate on topics I'm sure we could pontificate on endlessly. I included the infographic above for you to look at to give you some situational awareness. I've also included some links and the video below that describe the issue in greater detail. Have a look at any of these. What are your thoughts? Do you think this is something we need to concerned with? Is this something security practitioners need to be aware of when operating outside of the developing world or in water-depletion areas?

Water Wars Resources

http://www.mideastnews.com/WaterWars.htm

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/dark-side-of-natural-resources/water-in-conflict.html

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/2011622193147231653.html

http://www.globalwaterforum.org/resources/lectures/international-water-politics-short-lecture-series/

Loose Lips Just Don't Sink Ships - How Leaks Compromise More Than Just Secrets

This is how the Taliban handles spies.

I'll preface this piece by saying for the record "I am NOT a spy nor have I EVER been a spy. I have NEVER worked inside the intelligence community. What you read here is my opinion backed up by historically factual information." Whew! Now that I've gotten that out of the way, we can discuss a topic I've been meaning to cover - why unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information should remain illegal without legal protections for anyone.

Most people have no clue how the United States and other countries obtain their human intelligence. They assume we send American spies into foreign lands who sneak around embassies and high-end hotels and casinos battling terrorists and criminal kingpins. Most students of modern US intelligence will tell you that is NOT the case. In fact, how we get that intelligence is by sending American intelligence officers who are trained to be clandestine but who do not steal information themselves. That's right. Most human intelligence officers are highly-trained salesmen and recruiters who work diligently to get citizens from target countries to spy on their respective countries. In other words, our HUMINT officers convince other people to betray target states and organizations. We can also get that information by using third-party human intelligence from another country who may be more ethnically credible to penetrate certain denied areas. We'll touch on that later.

This week you have no doubt heard about the Associated Press debacle with the Department of Justice. What you may not be aware of is the "leak" in question is about the alleged penetration of our government  and the Saudi government into the terrorist organization al Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). This was a highly classified operation which I can only assume involved undercover assets who were willing to betray this very dangerous organization. Someone in the Obama administration took it upon themselves to reveal this operation to the Associated Press. This, of course, is VERY illegal and for good reason. Remember those undercover assets I mentioned previously? What do you think would happen to those assets who were operating without the expectation their involvement would be made public to the largest news source in the world? Take a wild guess.

Do you remember Aldrich Ames? He's the guy who betrayed his country and sold secrets to the USSR. What you may not know is that through his leak, he inadvertently killed 10 Russian citizens who fed the Central Intelligence Agency information. How about Valerie Plame? She's another asset who was "burned" (her covert identity revealed publicly) for very political reasons allegedly. I can assure the target country she worked in, Iraq, deployed several counterintelligence agents to contacts she  had in that country. Once an operation has been "burned", all of the assets involved are compromised and can no longer conduct their missions.

Given what you watched above, take a few things into consideration:

• The very real danger they pose throughout the region they operate in. 
• How recluse and difficult such organizations can be and the difficulty to get someone to betray this organization. 
• The operations we were able to stop because of this operation. One of which was the latest plane plot by AQAP. 
• The potential for further penetration and more insightful intelligence disappearing because a bureaucrat in D.C. took it upon themselves to deliver to the Associated Press information about the success of this ongoing operation. 
• The likelihood the assets were compromised and the likelihood of their survival and those with whom they had contact.

So you can imagine my surprise to learn of the AP's outrage that the DoJ was investigating their contacts with various people who had knowledge of this operation. You've heard, no doubt, the DoJ subpoenaed the AP's call records for over two months and then those of reporters who may have been the source's contact. I have 11 years of criminal investigations experience and will be the first to attest that this is very customary when you're looking to connect people from one area to another. Whether or not, the DoJ should have subpoenaed the AP's phone company is a different story and "way above my pay grade".

As you can guess, unauthorized disclosure of classified information is a crime. It's actually a very serious crime. Don't believe me. Here's the statute. You'll do good to note there is zero accommodation or exemption for releases to the press.

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information—(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or
(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or
(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or
(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes—
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
(b) As used in subsection (a) of this section—
The term “classified information” means information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution;
The terms “code,” “cipher,” and “cryptographic system” include in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications;
The term “foreign government” includes in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign country, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such government is recognized by the United States;
The term “communication intelligence” means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than the intended recipients;
The term “unauthorized person” means any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States.
(c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof.
(d)
(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this section shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of any provision of State law—
(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; and
(B) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.
(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that the defendant forfeit to the United States all property described in paragraph (1).
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the provisions of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) ofsection 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853 (b), (c), and (e)–(p)), shall apply to—
(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation to such property,
if not inconsistent with this subsection.
(4) Notwithstanding section 524 (c) of title 28, there shall be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund established under section 1402 of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42U.S.C. 10601) all amounts from the forfeiture of property under this subsection remaining after the payment of expenses for forfeiture and sale authorized by law.(5)As used in this subsection, the term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

As you can tell, the law is very specific and for good reason, as I outlined before. The business of deriving the intelligence we need from terrorist organization and rogue states requires secrecy. The best way I can describe the importance of keeping clandestine operations secret is to have you watch my child and I play "hide-and-go seek". Children love to tell you where they're going to hide because it makes it easier for you to catch them. Imagine if your child was very clever and never told you where they were hiding. Better yet, what if you never knew they were playing the game. Then, imagine if the stakes were higher - much higher than preempting a really good game. The same could be said of the modern spy game were exponentially more lives are at risk.

VIDEO: Kenyan Presidential Security

While reviewing the latest YouTube videos on security, I came across the video above. If you're not aware, Kenya recently held its presidential elections where Uhuru Kenyatta was named its fourth president-elect. As is the case in the United States, Kenya's head of state has a protection detail.

Here's what I gleaned from the video:

1. Kenyans have a different protection mentality than most Westerners which may actually be good. The news anchors were briefly explaining what happens once the election has been certified, when she said "he'll become the 'property of the state'". Additionally, the detail and not the principle control his/her security.
2. While awaiting the election to not be challenged, Uhuru will have a temporary detail and a code name assigned to him much like in the States where the president-elect receives his/her detail as soon he receives his party's nomination.
3. There details seem to be structured somewhat similarly as Western nations. There is an exterior perimeter surrounding the vehicle and an interior as well. The exterior appears to be doing some outward surveillance while the inner perimeter concentrates on the road ahead. They also seem to have control over the reception line as well.

While researching this story, I came across another video which was a bit more telling.

From this video, we can see a few similarities and some differences.

1. Changing radio call signs. No secrets here. Great tactic that is used all over the world.
2. Route clearance. Another great move. Though, I am curious why took this road. Many details would have avoided it for its obvious issues.
3. Open air vehicles should ALWAYS be a no-no.
4. Giving the principle the threat information briefing every night is good. Though, I think this should be something he gets along with his intelligence report first thing in the morning.

The Kenyans are moving in the right direction towards VIP security. There were lots of things I like from a protection specialist perspective. And there were things I did not like. Most of the things I did not like are lessons best learned through countless drills and exercises to hone in how vulnerable your principle is. In light of al Shabab's threats and terrorist activities against the Kenyans, it's safe to assume they are working out some of the kinks.

INFOGRAPHIC: A Day in the Life of Homeland Security

INFOGRAPHIC: Presidential Security Facts

(click to enlarge)

Presidential Security infographic by VisualApogee.

HOT: Real-time US Drone Strikes in Pakistan (You Should Bookmark This)

Real-Time U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan infographic by hrwgc.

I found this "gem" on a site called visual.ly which hosts a variety of infographics. The data was compiled fromdata from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism which "provides a live-updated database of U.S. covert drone strikes in Pakistan. There are other sources for this information, including New America Foundation and The Long War Journal, each of which has its own advantages and disadvantages." This has been the best resource thus far in terms of keeping track of drone strikes in Pakistan.

Why should any security professional be concerned with these strikes? These strikes are often done to eliminate "high value targets" (HVTs). It would be prudent for a security professional to understand when and where a strike has occurred in order to prepare for reprisal attacks on any resources deemed important to the United States government. This could also provide needed intelligence on a subject of interests in an environment where you do constant threat intelligence and analysis. It does a great job as well of illustrating the continued and progressive use of "unmanned aerial vehicles" (UAVs). Becoming aware of the technology and its real-world deployments and challenges, could aid a security professional in determining their applicability to their threat landscape. I HIGHLY recommend bookmarking this page for future reference, as the data will change day-by-day.

Who's More Advanced - Syrian Rebels or DARPA?

Every revolution starts almost the same way.  Rocks are thrown, then Moltov cocktails. Rebels amass small arms.  And then they get "creative".  The same can be said of Syrian rebels who have converted just about every piece of armament they've captured into another weapon.  Take for instance, their use of cluster bombs to manufacture rockets.  Wired Magazine did a piece with video from the rebels on just how this is done.

The fuses from cluster bombs get recycled in makeshift weapons foundries for use inside Qassam-style short-range rockets. Taking a page from Hamas in Gaza, the Syrian rebels are now manufacturing their own rockets — much as they have other weaponry — even though gulf Arab states keep a weapons pipeline flowing.

Back at the foundry, the intact fuse has its benefits. The rebels remove the tail fin from the cluster bomb, leaving the main charge, and then attach a homemade rocket motor.

They've even started manufacturing tanks.  That's right. You read it correctly.  They have designed their own "tank".  It's built from a disassembled car and uses on-board cameras with an video game console controller.  Yup. The Syrian rebels may be more advanced than DARPA.

US Navy X-47B UCAS first land-based catapult launch by theworacle

US Navy video of the first catapult launch of the Northrop Grumman X-47B unmanned combat aircraft system demonstrator (UCAS-D) on Nov 29, during shore-based aircraft-carrier integration testing at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. The X-47B is to take-off and land on a carrier at sea in 2013.

New Amendments to NDAA To Rectify Old Issues?? (not really)

“Detainees in orange jumpsuits sit in a holding area under the watchful eyes of Military Police at Camp X-Ray at Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, during in-processing to the temporary detention facility on Jan. 11, 2002. The detainees will be given a basic physical exam by a doctor, to include a chest x-ray and blood samples drawn to assess their health. DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st class Shane T. McCoy, U.S. Navy.”

Soooo....I caught this little gem while looking over the new National Defense Authorization Act 2013 amendments being voted on by the US Senate:

SEC. 1032. NOTICE AND REPORT ON USE OF NAVAL VESSELS FOR DETENTION OF INDIVIDUALS CAPTURED PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE.
    (b) Report.--
(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the use of naval vessels for the detention outside the United States of any individual who is captured pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Such report shall include--
(A) procedures and any limitations on detaining such individuals at sea on board United States naval vessels;
(B) an assessment of any force protection issues associated with detaining such individuals on such vessels;
(C) an assessment of the likely effect of such detentions on the original mission of the naval vessel; and
(D) any restrictions on long-term detention of individuals on United States naval vessels.
(2) FORM OF REPORT.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(a) Notice to Congress.--Not later than five days after first detaining an individual who is captured pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) on a naval vessel outside the United States, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a notice of the detention.

So when did we start detaining people on boats? You do realize this is what this alludes to? We have or had a need to so and someone in Congress wasn't notified until it was almost too late. Oh wait. That did happen to a guy named Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, a Somali terrorist held for over 2 months on a Navy ship.

This is the one that will surely make headlines (if it hasn't already):

SEC. 1032. PROHIBITION ON THE INDEFINITE DETENTION OF CITIZENS AND LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS. Section 4001 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
``(b)(1) An authorization to use military force, a declaration of war, or any similar authority shall not authorize the detention without charge or trial of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States apprehended in the United States, unless an Act of Congress expressly authorizes such detention.
``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to an authorization to use military force, a declaration of war, or any similar authority enacted before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2013.
``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to authorize the detention of a citizen of the United States, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, or any other person who is apprehended in the United States.''.

Yup. You read it right. No more arrests of US citizens or permanent residents overseas without arresting them and bringing them before a US court. Actually. That's not exactly true. Check out what the folks at the ACLU think:

• It would NOT make America off-limits to the military being used to imprison civilians without charge or trial. That's because its focus on protections for citizens and green-card holders implies that non-citizens could be militarily detained. The goal should be to prohibit domestic use of the military entirely. That's the protection provided to everyone in the United States by the Posse Comitatus Act. That principle would be broken if the military can find an opening to operate against civilians here at home, maybe under the guise of going after non-citizens. This is truly an instance where, when some lose their rights, all lose rights -- even those who look like they are being protected.
• It is inconsistent with the Constitution, which makes clear that basic due process rights apply to everyone in the United States. No group of immigrants should be denied the most basic due process right of all -- the right to be charged and tried before being imprisoned.
• It would set some dangerous precedents for Congress: that the military may have a role in America itself, that indefinite detention without charge or trial can be contemplated in the United States, and that some immigrants can be easily carved out of the most basic due process protections.

 It appears the contention about NDAA still stands.

My Problem With Benghazi Conspiracy Theories

Folks, I have some fundamental issues with most conspiracy theories.  Many have very little data to substantiate what they either indirectly imply or overtly say.  Most of it is pure speculation with very vague familiarity of the incident (i.e. "I have a cousin who knows a guy in the military that says", "Newt said", "I heard it from Sean Hannity").  If you weren't there, then it's just speculation.  The various theories and innuendos about Benghazi are of the same ilk.  I'll spell out why by attempting to debunk the top four Benghazi theories/innuendos:

1. As I mentioned before, Chris Stevens was NEVER EVER raped.  No one has stated this except for a lone newspaper out of Lebanon and few Facebook bloggers.
2. Chris Stevens was not killed as the result of being shot, beaten, or burned.  He was killed by smoke inhalation.  Simply put, it takes only 20 minutes of active burning for lethal levels of smoke and heated air to accumulate.  Charlene Lamb, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State, stated in her testimony before the House Oversight Committee on October 10, 2012, 
1. "Gunfire was heard from multiple locations on the compound.  One agent secured Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, the information management officer, in the safe haven.  The other agents retrieved their M4 submachine guns and other tactical gear from Building B.  When they attempted to return to the main building, they encountered armed attackers and doubled back to Building B. The attackers used diesel fuel to set the main building ablaze.  Thick smoke filled the entire structure.  The Diplomatic Security agent began leading the Ambassador and Sean Smith through the debilitating smoke toward the emergency escape window.The agent, nearing unconsciousness himself, opened the window and crawled out.  He then realized they had become separated in the smoke.  So he reentered the building and searched multiple times for the Ambassador and Mr. Smith.  Finally the agent—suffering from severe smoke inhalation and barely able to breathe or speak – exited to the roof and notified the Tactical Operations Center of the situation (TOC)." 
2. Even IF, the Department of Defense could have supplied tactical resources to respond to Benghazi, the likelihood Chris Stevens would have already been dead is very high.  Chris Stevens, more than likely, died at the early onset of this engagement.  Deputy Assistant Secretary Lamb got her intel from the TOC and the agents' after-action reports.  In other words, she heard it from the folks on the ground and not Fox, ABC, CBS, etc.
3. The Department of Defense got an email to stand down.  This one comes from our dear friend, Newt Gingrich.  You'll do good to click on that link and note the timing of that email in relation to the election and the word "rumor" (ahem!....not a fact) in his quote.  
1. Okay, folks the likelihood the DoD would have received an email to "stand down" is very unlikely.  If there is one thing we've learned since Ollie North, it's never send an email when involved in far-reaching conspiracies.  This conversation would have happened over a secure communications line or in person at the Situation Room and would have relayed the assets DoD would have needed to support and/or pull of a successful rescue operation and their respective availability.  I'm not sure if you're aware of this, but it takes the DoD a LONG time to respond to anything.  The assets (Special Operation Forces) DoD would have sent were more than likely on other missions related to GWOT (Global War on Terrorism).  Contrary to popular belief, the nearest special operations unit was in Rota, Spain. Folks, these guys don't ride on supersonic jets.  The flight time, not counting preparation, narrows your response time greatly.  Also, remember everything the government does in terms of its official actions is almost always recorded.  Leon Panetta will soon testify before Congress knowing this data was fully available to Congress.  My guess is Patraeus will testify to the same as it was his agency that provided most of the backup.
4. The White House is blackmailing Patraeus with the affair scandal.  Why?  Seriously.  Why would the White House blackmail a guy who was going to testify any way?  This investigation has been going on for months.  Why now?  Divorces are messy and affairs even messier but lying to Congress about what a whole division of an intelligence agency knew is even worse for everyone involved.  Patraeus and anyone with a pulse in DC knows that.  But wait - there are more problems with this theory:
1. The original investigator had sent shirtless pictures of himself to the victim.
2. The investigation began by a complaint from someone with no connection to the White House and also sleeping with another General officer supposedly.
3. The Patraeus affair would have presumably never have came to light had it not been for his mistress' threatening emails about her suspicions of the victim and Patraeus.  
4. Just in case you're wondering the FBI's jurisdiction in all of this, remember threatening someone is a crime and if done over email is federal offense due to the federal government's jurisdiction over interstate commerce.
5. Patraeus was still going to testify.  Remember Congress has subpoena power over anyone for any reason.  An oversight committee hearing is much like testifying in a court of law.  There is even oath.  The risk a blackmailer takes with blackmail once they reveal their hand is that target may be even more inclined to tell the truth.  If huge conspiracies are your thing, you can't afford to have this happen.
6. Two GOP congressmen knew of the investigation days before the election and just sat on it.  In any conspiracy, you need loyal and discreet people - a shirtless FBI dude and a couple of GOP congressmen "in the know" are less than ideal. 

Before I get deluged with comments, let me answer some questions:

Were there screw-ups in Benghazi? 

Yup. 

Am I excusing those? 

Nope.  

Do I believe this investigation has become partisan beyond comprehension?  

Yup.  

Do I think the American people will ever get the whole truth?  

No for a variety of reasons.  

Should this diminish our need to find the truth? 

No.  People died and we need to know why in order to fix it.  

What/who do you blame for these deaths?  I think it is very ironic the CIA is rumored to have had an annex devoted to assisting the Libyan government in covertly collecting heavy weapons such as mortars from local militias and the consulate across the street from them is hit by mortars.  There was an intelligence and diplomatic failure on several levels.  My sources in Libya tell me the government was beginning to crack down on these rogue groups who were holding on to these weapons as insurance and as leverage to further their own burgeoning political agendas.  My supposition is the CIA mission was discovered.  In order to show their discontent at the Agency's participation in this crackdown, they retaliated.  They couldn't identify the location of the CIA mission so I assume they hit the next biggest American target on a historic day.  As luck would have it, Chris Stevens was there.  Will we ever hear that from anyone?  No, but perhaps - just once - we need to.

Here's a link to all of the public testimony given so far:
http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-security-failures-of-benghazi/

Deal or No Deal: Did The Obama Administration Sell Us Out To The Russians?

By United States Navy photo (http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=36116) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

During a recent discussion with a friend, I came across an article in the Washington Times which reported the Obama administration was going to give away nuclear secrets to Russia.  The President stated, in his signing statement of this fiscal year's National Defense Appropriation Act, his intention to go against legislation written which would require him to report to Congress any deals he made with foreign countries with regards to weapons information and development.  It included instructions he couldn't make such deals without Congress's approval.  While, the President asserted these limitations went against his executive authority to conduct foreign affairs and saw them as "nonbinding", he did promise through Undersecretary of Defense Robert Nabors' letter to Senator Mark Kirk (R-IL), any such information would go through a "vigorous review" and he would seek advice from appropriate members of Congress.

Here's the question of the day: What information would the President be looking to exchange and with who.  Simply put, the limitations were put in place due to the administration's intention to exchange missile defense information with the Russians to reassure them our missile defense system was not offensive nor was it geared towards them.  The information entailed a single data point - the maximum effective range of the missile known as its burnout velocity.  MissileThreat.com defines it as, "The range of a missile is essentially determined by the velocity it reaches when all its propellant has been used up (its ‘burnout velocity’)." The weapon system in question is the SM-3, a ballistic missile shipboard interceptor.  Imagine a Patriot missile launched from a boat for nuclear missiles.

So why would the Obama administration give up such information?  The first thing that should be noted is information exchanges occur with the Russians all the time involving various weapon systems and programs.  On December 1, 2010, the US State Department issued a fact sheet on the then-draft Defense Technology Cooperation Agreement which stated,

"U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia cooperation on missile defense is intended to help improve our defensive capabilities, strengthen transparency, and reduce Russia’s concerns about the United States’ missile defense efforts by providing it with further insight into the nature of and motivations for U.S. and NATO ballistic missile defense plans and programs"

Most notably, defense information exchanges occur in compliance with our START II treaty requirements as well.  The amount of disclosure which has occurred with the Russians about our most lethal weapons is astounding.  Just because it happens all the time, shouldn't we be protecting our missile defense knowledge any way?  Not really.  This missile defense shield isn't being developed for the Russians entirely.  It was conceived with them in mind initially under the Reagan administration.  However, as our Iranian, Chinese, and Pakistani "friends" develop more sophisticated missile technology which could jeopardize American interests and our homeland eventually, the missile defense shield can no longer afford to be stationary with all its attention on Russia.

We could not afford to appear to the Russians as developing a weapon system directed towards them with offensive intentions.  This was the problem with the follow-up missile defense plan envisioned by the Bush administration.  It was difficult convincing the Russians that was not our intention when we wanted to park a bunch of missiles in their backyard.  So, the Obama administration nixed the idea for a mobile seaborne and airborne option.  The information they will exchange will only give them information about a single interceptor in the entire system.  The idea is to convince the Russians, even though the systems are mobile,  they pose no offensive concern for them absent an overt attack by them against us.

Given the nature of weapons development and testing cycles which are extremely lengthy before anything becomes operational and the Russians only recently (within the last 10 years) becoming active in new weapons technology, it would be a very long time before they developed a suitable countermeasure for this system which could see countless upgrades before then.  Seeing how the Russians, the Pakistanis, the Chinese, nor the Iranians have an SM-3 to test this information on, who says the data we provide has to even be correct?  It should also be noted this exchange goes along with former President Bush's plan that was suspended.  This is an extremely small price to pay when looking at being able to park a missile defense shield in the Persian Gulf or the Yellow Sea.

Here's a datasheet of the SM-3:
www.raytheon.com/newsroom/.../rtn_rms_ps_sm3_datasheet.pdf

Here's video of it in action:

Arms sales: Who buys our guns?

You ever wonder who we sell our guns and other weapon systems to? Turns out the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service conducted a study to find out.  The report is below.

Here is a table from that report you might find interesting.  Notice how dramatically sales have gone down in the last seven years.  While you're at it, let me know if you find any consistent leaders:

Here's the report as promised: