25 Items Every Security Professional Should Carry On-Site In Case S--- Hits The Fan

A picture of my "get-home bag"

I had the privilege of working as a private security officer as one of my first jobs after getting out of the military. I did this job in one of the most disaster-prone areas of the country - Florida. During my training and my time spent with coworkers and supervisors, I had many conversations about our duty to remain on-site during a natural disaster. These conversations had me asking many introspective questions about my own personal preparedness to fulfill this obligation. I knew I was highly trained and very skilled in providing the best protection possible for our clients. I was more concerned with the stark contrasts between my preparedness from when I did similar work in the military versus this new arena as a civilian. In the military, my post was equipped with gas mask, Chemical Biological Nuclear Radiation Explosive suits, food rations, radio, and a huge support network. As a civilian, I had none of these to face similar threats. It was this realization that sparked my determination to "prep".

"Prepping" is the application of various disaster preparedness concepts for personal and group survival in the event of a disaster. It's that simple. No Rambo survivalist fantasies stereotypes. Just people who want to better prepare for disasters in order to survive. With that in mind, "prepping" seems to be one of the most overlooked portions of the security officer's toolkit. Most agencies assign you a standard list of mandatory you need just to make it through a standard duty day. My hope is to provide you with a guide to get you through those not-so-standard duty days.

1. Flashlights. This goes without saying almost but I HIGHLY recommend carrying at least two more flashlights. In the picture above you will note two flashflights. I keep one for map reading and other minimum distance tasks. The other I use for longer distance tasks such as room clearing, site exploration, target acquisition, and signaling.
2. Compass, binoculars, and maps. Loads of security guys will carry the flashlight and maybe a knife and first aid kit. Few see the utility of having additional roadmaps and a compass. These tools are valuable for a variety of reasons in disaster scenarios that range from giving directions and position location to rescuers, navigation from one point on-site to another, and mapping terrain features and other locations as temporary shelter locations should they be needed.
3. Knives. I can't overstate why having a knife is a good thing in a disaster. There's practically an encyclopedia's worth of knowledge of the best utilities for a knife. I won't go over any of them here. However, I would like to specify the types of knives you should consider. I carry a defensive knife, three multi-tool knives, and a hunter's knife. These knives each serve a multitude of purposes and have served me in more ways than I can articulate in this space. Suffice it to say, if you don't get how these could benefit you in a disaster, then I suggest you get yourself in a situation where you need to cut, pry, hold, clamp, or stab something without them.
4. Notepad. Keep a notepad handy should you need to keep track of people in your area, emergency responders you've made contact with, how many people are on-site, etc. Anything and everything you feel you need to keep track of you should use this notepad for.
5. Tape. In my photo, you will notice electrical tape. I keep this tape in my kit mostly because this is my go-to tape for work and I keep it in the bag I take with me most in the field. It's also handy to have in my car for various vehicle breakdown scenarios. Before you ask, I also keep duct tape handy. It's another bag but I do have it and would use it over the electrical tape. The most important thing for security officers to note are the practical uses tape could have in a survival situation. In most cases, we use tape to keep things stuck together. There are a few more uses for tape other than this. I have used tape to close bandages, mark areas I cleared, hastily label items, etc. Just like knives, tape is another subject where the uses in a disaster are too large to discuss here. To say the least, if you don't already, keep some tape in your gear.
6. Cottonballs. I keep cottonballs in my kit for two reasons. The first is to have it to use as a dressing for wounds. The other is to use it for kindling in case a fire is needed. You may scoff at the idea of needing a fire in a standard duty. However, remember this list is for those non-standard duty days.
7. Whistle. It's a secondary communication device.
8. Lighter and "strike-anywhere" matches.
9. Signalling mirror. This is another communication device.
10. Address book. I keep all of the important numbers and information I may need in case cell service is out or my phone is dead. Most people are caught off-guard by how fast cell services goes out in disaster scenarios. Having a copy of your most important numbers is very important. You should consider having the numbers for:
    (a) Your local police and fire departments
    (b) Your home numbers and those of family members you may need to inform.
    (c) Your employer's numbers
    (d) The National Weather Service Dial-A-Forecast for your local area
    (e) 511 and 311. This will provide local government information and traffic information.
    (f) Local friends who may have some situational awareness about what's happening.
11. Debris mask. This is no substitute for a full respirator or gas mask but it could prove vital if the need arises.
12. Gloves. I normally carry both latex and work gloves. The latext I use to mitigate exposure to bloodborne pathogens, while I use the work gloves to mitigate exposure to various temperature fluctuations, rain, sharp or abrasive materials, and to gain better traction when gripping certain objects.
13. Paracord. Seriously, I don't have enough space in the world to discuss paracord. Get educated on how useful just a few feet can be, if you're not already, and I guarantee you'll be carrying it daily as a part of your kit.
14. Basic tools. Screwdriver with multiple bits and a hex lock tool. Also, if your bag allows, consider carrying a hammer and camp axe.
15. Emergency blanket.
16. Miniature towel.
17. Portable poncho.
18. Basic first aid kit with bandages, supplies for tourniquets, and other items you have been trained to use in a medical situation.
19. Food. I pack food for sustainment and morale purposes. In other words, in my kit, you will find food for meals like MREs and other high calorie food meals and morale like snacks and some candies. Anyone who has ever had to eat the same meal over and over again or who has to "stretch" a meal out over a few days knows the power having some variety in between can have on your morale.
20. Water and purification tablets. The water goes without saying. There could be a situation when you're stuck on site but with limited water options. Having water on hand and having the ability to purify the available water on-site will ensure you're meeting one of the most important survival needs.
21. Clothes. Ever been on a patrol and got rained on? I have and the impact it has on you physically and mentally is taxing. Physically, you can suffer from hypothermia and all the ugliness associated with that. Mentally, there is nothing better than knowing you can periodically change clothes if needed. Anyone who has ever been rained on during a foot patrol can attest to this.
22. Boots. See clothes.
23. Rucksack or versatile tactical bag. The bag you see pictured above is what my wife has deemed my "tactical man-bag". All joking aside, having a good bag to store your gear is of the utmost important. If you don't or can't go with a bag, then I suggest obtaining a pouch wherein you can carry your basic personal survival stuff in a pocket or some other storage compartment. You should test any bag to its limit. My recommendation, if your budget can handle it, buy a rucksack from the folks at GoRuck and evaluate the bag through their course. I have been meaning to do a GoRuck Challenge just for this purpose. No better way to see how your bag holds up other than through some stress. GoRuck puts on challenges that will do just that and give you some idea as to where you stand with another critical survival tool.
    
24. Conditioning. I hated this word in high school. It meant long runs and grumpy coaches. It also meant I would be better prepared for whatever the opponents threw at us that season. The same goes with disaster prep. You should be engaging in enough physical activities daily to prepare yourself for situations wherein your body could easily be the leading cause of death. Remember the first rule in the movie Zombieland was Cardio.
    
25. Train. The items on this are dependent on the most important tool you always carry with you - your mind. Please, don't buy any of the items on this list unless you feel you can adequately use them to save your life or the lives of others. In other words, if you don't know how to use the tool, find some training to figure it out or practice with the tools until you get it right. These items require the same amount of dedication to master as your firearm or other relevant security tools. 

This list is by no means all-inclusive. I will admit I have missed some very important stuff. However, I think I have covered the basics. Let me know if you have any other items you would suggest security officers carry should they find themselves in a disaster situation.

Kenya Mall Shooting - Why It Went All Wrong & What We Can Do To Be Better

Yesterday, the New York City Police Department released a report from its SHIELD initiative about the Kenya mall shooting/terrorist attack. It was a pretty damning report to say the least. Before we talk about the report, let's talk about SHIELD is and why that's important to understand in the context of this report. SHIELD is the NYPD's homegrown information-sharing component with private sector security. It provides analysis on current and future threats. I've previously read some of SHIELD's reports. Some were good and some were typical of fusion center reports - some meat and some potatoes but not a full meal. This report was driven, in part, to go over what NYPD and private security could learn about what happened in Nairobi. There was plenty.

There were some startling revelations:

1. Kenyan police were VASTLY outgunned. The report states, "The typical Uniformed Kenyan Police Officer is not as well equipped as their western counterparts, typically only carrying a long gun, most commonly an AK-47 style rifle with a folding stock, loaded with a single 30 round magazine. They do not carry handguns, wear body armor, gun belts or have portable radios to communicate." Each of the terrorist were carrying 250 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition. Lack of body armor and radios to communicate resulted in fratricide. More on that later.
2. Responding plainclothes officers were also outgunned and had no visible identification. Remember what I said about fratricide? From the report: "Very few of any of the plainclothes law enforcement first responders displayed any visible law enforcement identification such as a badge, arm band, ID card or  a raid jacket, making identification as “friend or foe” extremely difficult for other armed first responders."
3. Realizing the police were outgunned, Kenya made the incident response a military matter. That's as bad as it sounds. The report says, "Kenyan government officials decide to transfer the handling of this incident from the police to the military. A squad of Kenya Defense Forces KDF soldiers enters the mall and shortly afterwards, in a case of mistaken identity, the troops fired on the GSU-RC Tactical Team.They kill one police officer and wounding the tactical team commander. In the ensuing confusion both the police and military personnel pull out of the mall to tend to the casualties and re-group."
4. Responding military forces used an RPG-7 as a room clearing tool. I kid you not. And the destruction was insane. "It is reported that at some point during the day the Kenya Defense Forces decided to fire a high explosive anti-tank rocket (possibly a RPG-7 or an 84mm Recoilless Rifle) as part of their operation to neutralize the terrorists in the Nakumatt Super Market.The end result of this operation was a large fire and the partial collapse of the rear rooftop parking lot and two floors within the Nakumatt Super Market into the basement parking."
5. It is possible the terrorists escaped in part because the Kenyan security forces failed to secure a perimeter. It is rather elementary for the very first thing Western police do in these scenarios is to lock down the perimeter. No one comes in or out unless they can be positively identified as a "friendly". This credentialing occurs by checking IDs and only first admitting law enforcement and first responders to exit upon verification.
6. The mall employed unarmed officers who performed unsatisfactory "wand searches". This is irritating to say the least. Why? Unarmed officers are appropriate for certain environments and are the way to go in most environments. However, in high value targets, such as mass gathering locations in places like Kenya, I would have used an armed component. Armed officers are not only armed but can be equipped with radios and are usually uniformed. This makes identifying them for law enforcement somewhat easier. Also, armed officers can do things unarmed officers can't due to safety concerns such as locking down perimeters and evacuating victims.
7. Wand searches are weak. I dislike them with a passion. Why? Officers get tricked into believing a search was "good" because the wand didn't annunciate. This is all kinds of bad. A search should be thorough in high value targets. If you're going to employ officers and have them search, have them be thorough and do it without a wand. I would use the wand only in environments where I had other search mitigators in place such as backscatters or X-ray search devices.

So what does this attack teach us in the West?

1. The desire of terrorist groups to attack mass gathering locations is still very alive.
2. Places like malls should consider Kenya to be a warning. If you're in mall security, I highly suggest going over your active shooter plan and rehearsing it on a fairly regular basis with local police departments and simulated shooters. In these exercise, test not just your ability to minimize casualties but to also test your security apparatus under stress. This is best accomplished by "killing" responders, taking hostages, attempting escape, and causing confusion among responders. Get your people used to chaos in these scenarios.
3. Never do wand searches at high value targets and test your people regularly. I've gone over why I think wand searches are bad. So let's examine why you should test and train your searchers regularly. Searching is one of the most important yet often neglected security components. We usually pick rookies and the "lowest common denominator" to do this function because it's "easy". Doing good and thorough searches that you can go to sleep easy with at night are not easy. Searchers should be trained on subject "tells", physical characteristics of forbidden items by touch, sound, smell, and sight, the tools they can use to do searches better, etc. They should also be regularly "red-teamed" which is to say you should have a non-attributable person walk through security and see what they can get through. When they're done, they should report to management their findings.
   
   Here's a video I did on how I would search bags:
   
   
4. CCTV and analytics are EXTREMELY important to an active shooter scenario. There are several takeaways from what we learned about CCTV and the lack of analytics in Nairobi. First, CCTV coverage was spotty in some areas. Also, the CCTV coverage was easily identified and avoided by the terrorists. We also know while they had remote viewing capability, it was five miles away and more than likely not cross-fed into the police. While a CCTV monitor can't identify every threat, video analytics can alert them to suspicious activity. At the very least, consider it an option.
5. Garages and parking lots should be regularly patrolled. While there was a guard posted at the entrance of the garage, had a response element been closer by, they could have locked the exterior doors to the mall.
6. Train your employees on how to sound the alarm and IMMEDIATELY lock down their storefronts and secure customers. I would consider including them as a part of your active shooter training as well. Make that mandatory training for all storefront management and their trusted employees. I would include it in a leasing agreement if I had to.
7. Have a HIGHLY accessible public address system to sound the alarm.
8. Train local non-law enforcement responders on the need to "shoot, move, and communicate". Seriously, I can't stress this enough. There is a huge debate in the US surrounding concealed carry permit holders as responders. I'm okay with them responding, though I prefer they receive some training on  the need to identify themselves to law enforcement prior to responding via a phone call if time and circumstance permit.
9. Equip every security person and law enforcement officer with a radio.  If you want to avoid wasting your time clearing rooms that have already been cleared or fratricide, then you HAVE TO equip your responders with radios and share your frequencies with them.
10. Train your personnel on reporting formats like SALUTE. We've covered this before so I won't bore you with the details.
11. Train your security management personnel on casualty collection points, IED mitigation, cordons, perimeter searches, and periodic vulnerability assessments. These things can't be overstated in training. Trust me. You'll thank me for this later.

Security Officer vs Rent-A-Cop - Knowing the Difference Could Be Life or Death

"You're just a rent-a-cop", they said as I chased them from one end of the property to another. These particular trespassers had breached our property before and were stealing bikes from residents while they slept. But this day, I would not let them escape. As we got to the rear of the property, a large concrete wall appeared separating the property I was protecting and an adjacent housing area. Darn it. They were going to get away. I watched them scale that fence like the little, juvenile delinquent ninjas I knew them to be. The last one looked at me as he climbed the wall and yelled "Man, how can you be a rent-a-cop and live with yourself?. He then tossed several oranges at me and laughed. This was a weekly occurrence, as school recessed. That night, we lost an officer in the line of duty at another property doing the same thing I was doing.

I have countless stories like this from my time as a security officer. They all taught me a very valuable lesson - there is no such thing as a "rent-a-cop" or a guard. What security officers do and what they're responsible for requires a professional attitude and reception from both the people they protect and the public at large. However, that does not happen in the age where those who work security are often viewed as "wanna-be's", "rent-a-cops", "flashlight cops", and guards. We've all done it. I did it too. We go to our favorite shopping area and encounter a person who is obviously security. All we need is their physical appearance and a view of their demeanor for about five seconds to determine what category they fit. Yet none of us has ever contemplated the reasons why we have these officers in place. 

Often, officers are viewed as a "necessary evil" deployed at the behest of an unknown proprietor who just wants to protect his property. Although, I have met managers and proprietors who treated security as though it was something they didn't want but felt they had to have for whatever reason. This perception of officers then makes its way to officers as well who view themselves as what they portrayed. This leads to a cadre of officers who either don't work to change that perception or who really do personify it to become employed in the field as a refuge.

So how do we change that perception? Well, we need standardization - the ugliest word in security. We need to set clear and concise guidelines as to what constitutes the duties, responsibilities, and authority of officers. Many proprietors and officers have no clue what their job is other than to "protect stuff and stay out of the boss' way". You see this commonly in establishments where officers have a very lackadaisical attitude to situation awareness and who lack a proactive approach to security. They walk around with glazed eyes, reading the latest crossword section, and not paying any attention or having any investment into having a secure environment. Supervisors of these officers are scarcely seen and are often reluctant to dispel the perception as well. Managers, proprietors, and security supervisors should have written guidelines and procedures for officers to study, be knowledgeable about, and follow strictly.  They should also understand what authority they convey over occupants, tenants, and others on the property that extend to trespass warnings or even effecting arrests in some circumstances.

Next, better screening of officers to perform the duties required is needed. Why hire a senior citizen who can barely walk without assistance to patrol a strip mall on foot? You're certainly not deterring crime and are providing a presumably inadequate response element when an incident occurs. This screen should take into account the usual - felonies, misdemeanors, drugs, theft, etc. It should also recognize military and law enforcement service, previous security experience, and expectations for the job. That last item is very critical. When I worked security, I was appalled by the number of people I encountered who saw this as a just another job and not a potential career. Many believed the job was "beneath" them or was too tedious and felt underwhelmed. Managers should hire employees who see security as being an integral part of how companies protect their assets and their customers and who don't see the job in the same light as they do cooking burgers at a chain-restaurant. 

We also need to change how proprietors view the profession. Some see those who do the jobs as something anyone can do. There is perhaps nothing that caused me more frustration than this attitude. Many times working security can be very hazardous and life-ending. My nights were often filled with "shots fired" calls and armed assailants. I was surrounded by drug dealers and other nefarious people daily. I had to learn a second language just to be able to do my job. I had to train in non-lethal techniques, hand-to-hand combat, marksmanship, first aid, and fire suppression. Tell me again how anyone can do this job.

Don't get me wrong. I realize not all companies or proprietors are like this. There are  many who screen their officers, who deploy them with the expectation they will be utilized fully, and properly supervise them. There are some, though, who perpetuate the stereotype of "flashlight cops" by employing officers who conduct their duties in that manner. There are also proprietors who contract these companies because they are often the cheapest. This does little to provide meaningful protection nor does it provide an accurate portrayal of how professional officers conduct themselves. Many would say the easiest way to change this is with effective national legislation or at the very least legislation in states who have none for officers. Some states don't even make it a requirement to have officers be licensed. Having worked in a state that does, I can't imagine doing it without one let alone hiring a company that wasn't. 

Nothing is perhaps more telling than the hazards officers face in this line of work. Take a look at these statistics from Private Officer International from 2011:

• Injuries and assaults saw a 17 percent increase over 2011.
• There were 112 on-duty deaths.
• 103 killed were male; nine were female.
• The media age of those killed was 46 years old; the youngest was 19.
• The top three places officers were killed were: nightclubs, residential areas, and retail centers.
• The top three places officers were assaulted were: retail centers, nightclubs, and hospitals.
• Top three causes of death were gunshots (65), trauma (14), and stabbing (9).
• There were four on-duty confirmed suicides

What I've outlined is a comprehensive plan to standardize, professionalize, and enhance the job of asset protection.  The American Society for Industrial Security is at the forefront of this. They have published a guideline that is a standard-bearer in some organizations. We can no longer accept the mantra that those who work on the frontlines of crime are mere "rent-a-cops". If there is one thing we've learned in recent years, more and more officers are making the ultimate sacrifice. The shameful part of all of it is not their deaths but our apathy towards recognizing the distinct professionalism required to do this job.