Last week, I wrote a post regarding “security myths”. In that post, I was hesitant to be overly critical of the United States Secret Service’s response to recent intrusions. In the days following my article, there have been very illuminating leaks regarding exactly what happened that day. One revelation was the intruder actually made his way inside the White House. Before the leaks, I stated whatever the After Action Reports revealed; the entire incident was not a mission failure. I stand by that conclusion for a few of the reasons outlined below:
1. Mitigation is the goal of any security program. The idea that we, in security, prevent bad things from happening is a huge myth. You can lock your doors and windows to thwart bad guys but the only people who make the final determination whether the bad guys continue are the bad guys. We mistakenly believe security is a physical entity we can see, when in fact, it is a psychological construct designed to enable us to move on from our fears to do other important things vital to survival. What we seek is protection which is only achieved by mitigation. Mitigation is what we do to reduce the potential harm inflicted on us if the adversary should show up. So the lock does not prevent crimes but its presence gives us some sense of security, while it also mitigates potential threats that may come via the doors.
Prevention is perhaps the one thing we don’t control but assume we should. In the case of the Secret Service, yes, there were lapses in security. Uniformed personnel were obviously not able to sufficiently cover the grounds of the White House. They could have done more to secure the doors and should have posted someone able to engage a threat coming for the North Portico doors. Someone at Secret Service did on multiple occasions succumb to allowing convenience to overrule the imperatives of adequate mitigation. The White House staff and the United States Secret Service did fall for the psychological trap of security, instead of following a plan that guaranteed mitigation.
Feeling safe is not the same as being safe. That being said, various mitigation tools did work like the successful evacuation of the press and staff who were in danger. Also, an off-duty agent was successful in aiding in the apprehension of the subject. It’s important to note the Secret Service’s mission is to protect the President and Vice President as well as all principles designated by law. In short, with no loss of life, this mission was accomplished solely because other mitigation tools had a chance to do what they were designed to do. It was a mess and it certainly does not reflect well on the Secret Service.
2. Prevention as a security goal and task are unrealistic. An old adage I remember from my days in the Air Force is “the enemy gets a vote”. No matter how good your plan is or how great your mitigation tools and techniques are, nothing you do will prevent the enemy from doing anything except killing him. Detention is, at best, only guaranteed to delay their actions. In fact, the only reason I believe the saying “Only you can prevent forest fires” is because I always thought Smokey the Bear was talking to potential perpetrators of forest fires and not victims. So why do we insist on believing prevention is realistic, if we’re solely addressing victims? What most people want are more effective mitigation tools but assume the semantics mean the same when they don’t.
3. Every security organization is bound by the use of force continuum. Some argue the Secret Service should have killed the subject immediately. Many of these people ignore Graham vs Connor which dictates the level of force an officer can use against any subject. That standard is called the “objective reasonableness standard”. This comes from the idea an officer can use whatever force is necessary to stop any threat as long as that force is comparable to what a reasonable officer would deploy in similar circumstances. Would a reasonable officer shoot a potentially unarmed man just because he committed a trespass violation? Imagine the precedence we could set by implying under certain circumstances it is reasonable to kill someone for seemingly minor offenses. Does a simple trespass have the potential to be more at the White House? Oh, for sure. Until a person displays a lethal “intent, opportunity, and capability” against another, we are bound to use the force a reasonable officer would to stop the threat. Otherwise, we stand the chance of the White House become a favorite spot for those looking to die via “suicide by cop” or placing the White House and its security at the center of a potential tragedy.If these statements make you upset, then I implore you to read what I said again. I never said deadly force was not authorized. It is. Deadly force can be used as soon as the threat meets those three criteria I established prior.
4. Like it or not, the White House is a tourist attraction and that complicates things greatly. Did you know the White House receives millions of visitors annually? This accounts for those who merely gaze through the fence and those who come to take a tour. In partnership with the Park Service, the United States Secret Service is tasked with protecting the White House in spite of the enormous opportunity various threats have to carry out an attack either against the throng of tourists or the President. In most executive protection assignments, the principles address is a matter of neither public record nor access. The Secret Service is in the unenviable position of protecting the President in a vastly different environment. Measures we’d like to see taken in one regard (i.e. fortifications) which help mitigate the visibility of the grounds and the principles are often not what the public envisions when they come to see their “house”.
5. In some executive protection circles, if not most, there is a delicate balance between protection and convenience. Most people who have never worked an executive protection detail don’t get how often the people protecting dignitaries are overridden when it comes to matters of convenience. I have known a many of personal protection officers who have complained they have been told to “stay with the car” when a VIP goes some place where his protection details has no visibility.
With the White House incident, we learned a key mitigation tool was rendered ineffective because the White House Usher’s Office decided the intrusion notification system was too loud and needed to be turned off. In a world where one sees protection and is lulled into feeling “safe”, this is an easy mistake to make. It never costs you in the short-term. It won’t hurt today but you can bet when the adversary shows up, you’ll wish you had that mitigation tool in place. Is this a fault of the Secret Service? Sure, in some ways. They could have pressed the issue and said “no”. They, not the Usher, are legally mandated to protect the President. If that tool aids them in doing so, then the tool stays. Period. Is there a culture in Secret Service that enables this? I don’t know. What I can tell you is there is a culture in DC and the White House that does. Hopefully, the hearings which are going on will further highlight the need to silence the parts of that culture that negate sound protection practices.
6. Finally, stuff just happens. During my 14 years in this industry, I spent 10 in the service of the United States Air Forces in military law enforcement and security. My first few years were spent as a young Airman performing what is commonly termed as “gate guard” duties. I stood at the main gate of our installation controlling entry and exit. I was also responsible for issuing countless visitor passes. I was really good at my job. So good that I was winning awards and accolades above my peers. However, on one fateful day, I encountered something no one expected.
A female Technical Sergeant and her male guest came to the visitors’ center looking to get a visitor pass. All that was required at the time was a military ID card from her and a government issued ID from him. I checked his ID which was a passport and noted all of the details had matched. Our conversation was good and I detected nothing extremely peculiar. Actually, I did note something but I was stationed in Idaho so it was not a big deal at the time. Her guest asked if he could bring his personal weapon on the base. I told him he could not and asked if he had the weapon. He replied he hadn’t and she reassured me he hadn’t one. The question seemed one of mere curiosity in an attempt to make “small talk”. I had done everything I could do at that moment.
It was not until two days later was I approached by our investigators and several federal agents informing me several tactical vehicles were coming to apprehend him for being a fugitive – he had killed several people and almost killed a police officer. I was crushed. How could this happen? Should I have asked more questions? Would they blame me?
Years later, still torn by this, I asked a mentor who informed me I had done nothing wrong and in fact did everything right. Despite my best efforts, the adversary won. This is an unfortunate but inherent ingredient of protection. No matter what you do, the enemy will still do what he does and it is your job to prepare for that and win.
6. Finally, stuff just happens. During my 14 years in this industry, I spent 10 in the service of the United States Air Forces in military law enforcement and security. My first few years were spent as a young Airman performing what is commonly termed as “gate guard” duties. I stood at the main gate of our installation controlling entry and exit. I was also responsible for issuing countless visitor passes. I was really good at my job. So good that I was winning awards and accolades above my peers. However, on one fateful day, I encountered something no one expected.
A female Technical Sergeant and her male guest came to the visitors’ center looking to get a visitor pass. All that was required at the time was a military ID card from her and a government issued ID from him. I checked his ID which was a passport and noted all of the details had matched. Our conversation was good and I detected nothing extremely peculiar. Actually, I did note something but I was stationed in Idaho so it was not a big deal at the time. Her guest asked if he could bring his personal weapon on the base. I told him he could not and asked if he had the weapon. He replied he hadn’t and she reassured me he hadn’t one. The question seemed one of mere curiosity in an attempt to make “small talk”. I had done everything I could do at that moment.
It was not until two days later was I approached by our investigators and several federal agents informing me several tactical vehicles were coming to apprehend him for being a fugitive – he had killed several people and almost killed a police officer. I was crushed. How could this happen? Should I have asked more questions? Would they blame me?
Years later, still torn by this, I asked a mentor who informed me I had done nothing wrong and in fact did everything right. Despite my best efforts, the adversary won. This is an unfortunate but inherent ingredient of protection. No matter what you do, the enemy will still do what he does and it is your job to prepare for that and win.
